

Captive Mind Revisited

ISBN: 978-83-88292-84-2



Villa Decius 2008



 european cultural foundation



The following book is a post-conference publication of the Captive Mind Revisited debates, organised by the Villa Decius Association in October 2007. By this publication we would like to express our gratitude to the European Cultural Foundation and Smart Practical Logic for their support and assistance.



# Captive Mind Revisited



*Over half a century ago, when Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain, Czesław Miłosz wrote about the phenomenon of the 'enslaving of minds' present in the states of the Soviet bloc, and about the 'Hegelian bite', responsible for that. Perceiving history as a process controlled by neither a single person nor communities, led Central and Eastern European 'captive minds' to affirmation of the status quo and the ascertainment that – since a different world cannot exist – one has to serve the one at hand. Can our minds be enslaved again even now, when the Iron Curtain and the Soviet bloc are nothing more but the past?*

The 'Captive Mind Revisited' International Conference was an attempt to reflect and discuss these social phenomena which – present in public sphere – should have become a subject of deeper interest, not only of academics but also of those individuals and societies who still find the future of the European Union, and its political, economic, social and human dimensions important. The programme of the conference combined intellectual contributions from internationally recognised personalities and European experts with debates and discussion sessions open to representatives of political organisations, academic and cultural milieux, NGOs, public administration, and media from Poland and abroad.

Organised on the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the Conference became an attempt at a comprehensive roundup of the 20th-century European chapter and a fresh look into the 21st-century post-utopian Europe. The debates focused on those 'actors' of the public sphere who can influence minds and imagination of societies and who are present on both national and international scene, that is on political ideologies, elites and culture.

**Danuta Glondys**  
Director of the Villa Decius Association  
Polish Forum of the European Cultural Foundation

Captive Mind Revisited was the intriguing title of an international conference, initiated and organised by the Villa Decius Association in close co-operation with the independent European Cultural Foundation together with other partners and supporters on October 11-12, 2007 in Krakow.

Half a century ago Czesław Miłosz had described in *Captive Mind* the phenomena of 'enslaving the minds' of communities living in the states of the Soviet bloc. In what state are the former 'captive minds' now, when Communism belongs to the past? Can all our minds 'be enslaved' again in view of the global challenges of today? How important are culture and the arts in facing these challenges and avoiding the traps of 'enslaving'?

These were the core conference questions with many sub-questions such as: New nation states at the end of the globalised era, what is left of The Left from East- and West-European points of view? Is there an East-West Apartheid in Europe's intellectual life? Has multiculturalism failed as a project? And: Have we left an 'utopian Europe' behind us in view of global capitalism, growing populism and mixed feelings towards the Western superpower, the United States of America?

These complex issues with many layers were debated lively not only among politicians, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, political scientists, cultural researchers, social philosophers and experts on social and political aspects of transformation in post-communist countries, but also by artists, students, young researchers, representatives of NGO's and the media from Eastern and Western Europe, as well as from the US and Canada.

No doubt, the conference was a big step forward towards raising further awareness and deeper understanding of 'the Other' in our culturally very diverse Europe. It was also an articulation of our common belief in promoting democracy and tolerance within and across our borders.

**Kathinka Dittrich van Weringh**  
Chair of the European Cultural Foundation

The Villa Decius Association

Danuta Glondys

Profesor Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick, Jan Sowa Ph.D., Olga Glondys

Joanna Krawczyk

John Ralston Saul

Jacek Żakowski, Polityka weekly, Poland

Michal Vašečka, Ph.D., Masaryk University, Czech Republic/Slovakia

Paddy Coulter, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Professor Janusz Majcherek, Pedagogical Academy, Poland

Professor David Ost, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA

Professor Michael Daxner, Magna Charta Observatory, Austria

Professor András Láncki, Corvinus University, Hungary

Professor Zdzisław Krasnodębski, University of Bremen, Germany/Poland

Professor Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick, University of Oslo, Norway

Professor László Rajk, Hungarian Film Academy in Budapest, Hungary

Professor Stanislav Shushkevych, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus (1991-1994)

Professor George Kolankiewicz, University of London, United Kingdom

Professor Unni Wikan, University of Oslo, Norway

Professor Fredrik Barth, Boston University, USA/Norway

Gottfried Wagner, European Cultural Foundation, The Netherlands

Professor Zdzisław Mach, Jagiellonian University, Poland

Oleksandr Hrycenko, Ukrainian Centre of Cultural Studies, Ukraine

Jan Sowa, Ph.D., Jagiellonian University, Poland

Paul Gillespie, Ph.D., The Irish Times, Ireland

Les Levidow, Ph.D., Open University in London, United Kingdom

**Organiser**

**Initiator**


**Scientific advice**

**Conference coordinator**

**Opening lecture**

**Moderators**

**Experts**






**Participants and experts of the Captive Mind Revisited conference**




**Jacek Żakowski**



**Michael Daxner, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, David Ost**



**John Ralston Saul, George Kolankiewicz**



VD  
VILLA  
DECIUS

OPENING LECTURE

# The New Nation-State at the End of the Globalist Era

**Professor John Ralston Saul**

Minds are captured in a strange way. The problem is when they are captured; they do not know it is happening. The concept of the prisoner of ideology is a mysterious notion in Western Civilizations, since our idea of ourselves portrays us as perfectly rational, and therefore, it blends in against ideology. But in fact, we are probably the most ideologically susceptible civilization in the world. Other civilizations have their weaknesses too, but I do not know of any other civilization which is so easily tempted into ideologies, and so convinced intellectually and emotionally in them. Globalism and globalization are words you have already heard being used several times today. We no longer ask ourselves what it actually meant. The second linguistic observation would be that globalization and globalism, in any language, are usually used as if they were a replacement for other words, like – internationalism. Whereas someone might have said a word that implied something international, you now say globalization or globalism. In Western Europe and North America you cannot get through a middle or upper middle class dinner party without one saying: globalization is wonderful. Nowadays kids are taking one year after school to travel around the world. The British used to call it the Grand Tour, now it is called globalization.

One has to be very careful about this concept and not to mistake it for what we would like it to be mistaken for. Now globalisation is a word that means anything.

This actually means you can get out of what it really means, because you can use it to mean almost anything. Therefore, we use it in a very vague and emotional way. Globalization is not a difficult notion – go back to the 50's and 60's and bore yourselves out of your mind by reading the hundreds of economic papers and speeches written by people that would later become economists, deputy ministers, advisors to prime ministers and presidents or people who wrote in the newspapers, and you will see exactly what globalization said it was going to be and should be. Up until 1985, then from about 1985 to 1999, it became more obscure and more all-consuming. Then, from 1995 on – I think one could say from 1989 – it moved from offence to defence. The true believers of globalization spoke about it with more and more fearful passion, as they began to see it slipping away. To defend it, it was necessary to argue that the Grand Tour was globalization, that science was globalization, that everything was globalization, and that to be against it equalled being either populist or nationalist and either fearful or old-fashioned. In other words, they were trying to create a kind of Manichaeic division in which, if you were modern and sensible you were for globalization, and if you were not, you were fearful and narrow. Globalization was inevitable. Of course, there are some philosophers who, even if they disagree with everything else that I say, will agree that the moment of major international or national movements began to describe themselves as 'inevitable'. It is obvious that they are very close to an end. It is one of the most obvious signs of fear and fragility, because we know there are not many things inevitable in this world, except death and sex.

In a pre-globalist period, a wonderful trans-subject group including scientists and all sorts of humanists, politicians, generals and economists, could join in intellectual debate, and be a part of the discussion. Here economists really would not fit, would be extremely uncomfortable. They would take the floor and you would not know what they are talking about, and they would be pleased about that. The construction of what they would have to say here would be, on the one hand, certain and, on the other hand, lazy, because it is not necessary for you to understand what is certain. In a sense they are cast apart. Yet, one could argue that they are the ruling caste.

For the first time in the history of Western Civilization, the economists have a piece of the ruling caste – you could say it is their turn. On the other hand, if we were talking about the great economists of the past two wars – well-read, broadly educated, intellectualists in a true sense, then it might have been interesting to have them as the ruling intellectual caste.

**The current view is that you are either for or against globalization.**

The current view is that you are either for or against globalization. It is a terrible trap, because it means that we are unable to come at the intellectual situation which is dominant today, that major world questions are not looked at through culture. They come out through a prism that is neither God, political parties, nor democracy; it is economics. In a sense, everything is shaped by an economic prism, and that is something brand new – a kind of intellectual and political revolution of the sort we have not seen before. Even Marx did not believe that you have to look at the world through an economic prism. And so, this is a terrible trap for humanist groups, because it can exclude us. It is a trap for all those who consider themselves as democrats, or belong to the centre or the centre-left, or look for a new kind of left, which is not the inheritance of the left of the last 60 years. Suddenly, in order to get into the conversation, you almost find yourself branded as marginal, old-fashioned, arcanum of nationalist or, at the very extreme, populist. It is a kind of intellectual blockage in Western Civilization.

Nowhere else in the world are people suffering intellectually the way we are. They may be suffering in reality or not, but they are not suffering intellectually – the Chinese are not agonizing over this intellectual question, they just think, 'We are silly to be so impractical about the relationship between reality and the economy.' And it makes it very difficult for people like us to re-conceptualize how things might work in the world, how they might be made to work. The world is evolving anyway, so if we cannot figure out how to intellectually re-conceptualize it, the world is not going to wait for us. If we sit around feeling that we are prisoners of this sort of economic ambush, the world will just keep on moving. We will look up one day and find it completely different. We will not understand how it got there and how we did not see it going there. It will happen so because we accepted this Manichaeic trap into which the West has put itself.

I was reading your reports from last year's conference, when László Rajk said, 'We are only just starting to realize that we are going to have the same problems, in the East and the West equally.' In other words, the time sequences, which some people had referred to already, for how long people will do various things, do not matter. Different things will happen at different times and in different places, but the problems are the same and they interact with each other. That is international integration and international dependence. And some may say 'The main difference between the intelligentsia in the West and in the East is that we (the East) were absolutely successful [...] I have yet to see any intellectuals in the West who have ever had



a successful revolution.' Some also can say 'Then why is the intelligentsia in the East so silent now?' And then he said, 'probably we feel content' having won. But of course these are the dangerous temptations of victory. In many intellectual circles people felt that they are now free to do what Western European, American and Australian-Asian intellectuals were doing at universities, which is to shut themselves more and more inside the universities. After all that is what Harvard, Yale, London and Paris want. Everybody is sliced up into a thinnest, narrowest, highest possible silo, with different dialects, ways of speaking and thinking, so that conversations, in the manner this Villa is designed to make happen, are virtually impossible. It is so interesting in a place like this that it is going against what universities eventually make happen throughout the Western world. It is easy to slip into that, because that is what is expected, that is how the Nobel Prize is given, that is how peers judge papers and silo is the narrowest possible specialization. It is extremely interesting, because we all want our livers to be operated on by somebody who understands what a liver is, but on the other hand, it makes it extremely difficult for any kind of re-conceptualization of the way in which the world might be running. By accepting this silosation of the intellect, when one also accepts what is happening at Western universities, in which the professors are increasingly cut off from the rest of the real world, and have less and less influence on it, except indirectly, through a process of advising which actually removes from intellectuals what is most interesting about them. They are actually trained to have a narrow specialization, but at the same time to have a broad, integrated approach towards thinking and speaking in public. That, of course, has comforted the narrowest of all possible groups of specialists, the dominant group of economists in their position of leadership. What they have, that nobody in this room has, are troops to go with them. Who are their troops? Where do the troops come from? Probably from management schools, which are the part of universities that receive the most money. So, you have the cadre of economy generals with an enormous army of managers and consultants who, in a sense, pull together what you have cut apart. The managers, who have no education in thinking, conceptualization or culture, are in charge. So, you have a kind of victory of a very narrow thought form, and then, a very broad form of approach towards how to run society. That leaves humanists out of the relevant picture, without real influence, even if called upon periodically to do things.

Globalization is narrow and lacking in essential doubt and humanist qualities, because it is about certainty. Thinking that there are no alternative economic or social or political proposals, which creates an extremely dangerous situation, is coming to

**Globalization is narrow and lacking in essential doubt and humanist qualities, because it is about certainty.**

an end. There is no other intellectual language that would have any kind of power in public discourse. There is an opposition language, which is either emotive or not, but it is not a replacement language, because opposition in this context is like the shadow of the thing that it is opposing.

As a result, there is a kind of unconscious drifting in Western civilization. We have political leadership and senior civil servants who are confused by what reality is doing versus what their language tells them they should do. There is very little relationship between the language of power and the reality of what is happening in the world today. You will find very confusing language coming out of the G8, or the United Nations. Yet what they say about China has nothing to do with what is happening there. It is the only language to talk about China for the Chinese to recognize or be able to deal with. I am taking China as an example because it is the one that is the most often used inappropriately. A Western minister goes to China trying to improve the situation, which sounds fine in Western language, but in fact he is not resolving Chinese problems. What the Chinese delegation does is nod and say, 'Yes, minister; lovely minister; I hope you had a nice time.' And he is gone. He had a safe stay in China, but this country is still doing what it is doing, and the minister has no idea why what he said had no impact. It is because he did not have the appropriate language to allow him to really communicate with them.

This drifting and this lack of the appropriate language to deal with reality means that it is a sort of vacuum, which is quite common at the end of a period of power. Periods of ideological power are usually followed either by a quick revolution, or by a period of vacuum, during which people regroup and find a way out of it, which is what happened at the end of the 20th century. As a result, it is historically normal to see the return of populism. Is it good? Of course not. Is it natural? Absolutely.

**The lack of leadership language combined with an ideological vacuum results in populism appearing out of nowhere.**

The lack of leadership language combined with an ideological vacuum results in populism appearing out of nowhere. But historically this is not out of nowhere. I will give a couple of examples. New Zealand, which was in a way the perfect 'show-off-baby' of globalization in 1999, after a disastrous ten years, decided to go to in the reverse direction, not towards protectionism or nationalism. They said they were not going to do globalization, but to do something else. And they were extremely successful. Other examples are the Asian economic recession in 1997, in which the globalists' forces said they should deal with the economy in a globalist way. Everybody agreed, except Malaysia, and now the only country that came out of it well was

Malaysia. It happened so because they broke every single rule of globalist economics, and the result was their economy recovered very quickly and stably, and they were one of the fastest growing economic forces in Asia. On the other hand, Thailand did what it was told by the globalists' forces, and ended up with a corrupt Prime Minister, which eventually led to a coup d'état. Latin America spent nine years trying to implement globalization. At the end of the century the countries realized it did not work and now the whole continent is going in a different direction.

A very interesting detail to observe is in intellectual property, and billions of dollars put into the World Trade Organization by lobbies. If intellectual property is not removed from the WTO, the organisation may blow apart, as more and more countries are refusing to accept international regulations and global trade resolutions regarding intellectual property. Thailand is the most recent country to say it had a choice between people dying and cheap pharmaceuticals and it did not care about international law. These countries are absolutely right, and we are waiting for the revolution that will reappear when the ageing population of the US refuses to pay for expensive drugs.

Country after country is putting in place rules on take over the large corporations. Six or seven years ago, economists and people from the globalist movement would reply to anti-globalist forces at home by saying, 'Do not be so naive, look at China, is not China wonderful for embracing globalization, is it not fabulous?' Then, about three years later, they started to notice the number of Chinese shoes and dresses arriving, and they started to say, 'Well, that is what we meant.' When another two years went by, they started to say to China 'No, when we said globalization, we did not mean what you are doing now!' The USA started putting tariffs on China; they started to act in a protectionist manner, while the language continued to be globalist. Nobody at any university said that they had said globalization had been the thing that had actually happened and that they were doing the precise opposite with the country that had been said to be the most valuable winner from globalization. Inside China people do not talk that way at all. There is an enormous battle between Beijing and the provinces; the latter being in favour of a rather old-fashioned globalist approach. Beijing is increasingly against it. Recently China has put out a Five Year Plan which included 'a conception of equilibriums as a basis for how public policy will be built. The five equilibriums are: a humanist column and a globalist column (which means domestic versus international); interior versus the coast (the coast is where the factories are); rural versus urban; society versus the

economy; and nature versus self-interest. The instructions from the Chinese government were that in any choice taken by public officials the Chinese people should be in favour of the humanist column over the globalist column. Will they succeed? I have absolutely no idea. It may actually mean civil war. It is a very tense time in China as a result of this.

The second thing they have done was to put out an action plan for civil servants based on 25 benchmarks. The key benchmarks by which action is to be judged are such things as the medical wellbeing of the population, the environment, etc. In other words, they are trying to restructure what they have been doing in order to go in a very different kind of direction. In March 2007, the Chinese Prime Minister gave a speech in which he said, 'The speed of the fleet is determined not by the ship which travels the fastest, but by the one that travels the slowest.' It is interesting that he chose consciously to use a naval image. He must have known he was replying to the globalists' naval image. What he was dealing with was the rich-poor divide, which, when I look at the statistics, is very important in Poland. It is an important question throughout the West, as well as in China.

Why am I recalling all these Chinese details? It is because I think that China is the country which best illustrates the extent to which the intellectual basis for the globalist movement is local. It is 19th century English economic theory picked up by some people in the United States and Western Europe, and people working at universities. It is a very old-fashioned Western approach on how to do things. Nobody outside the West takes us seriously; they can sell us things, but the theory they believe in is ridiculous. But we go on projecting ourselves to the world as if everybody believed in their theories.

Let's go to India now. When you do an analysis of how often India is mentioned in the media and in what context, you will see that in the last ten years of the globalist period in India, one million new jobs of the globalist sort have been created. Every year in India eight million people come to the new job market. Is it important? Of course it is. Has it changed India fundamentally or are they becoming westernized? No, they are doing something else. It has very little to do with Western globalization. I would like to make here two broad points. The first is that globalist theory is an old-fashioned combination of two English and lowland Scottish 19th century economic theories, which were based on the maximization of production, trade and consumption – we can call it growth. The basis for it was the shortage of consumption goods.

For the last quarter of a century the world has been in surplus. That, of course, does not mean that everybody has enough. It means that the production of everything that you are wearing, everything you can find in this room, except the paintings, is in surplus. In consequence, we are using a theory of scarcity in a period of surplus. It means one cannot have any real values. Capitalism is based on values and competition in a condition of scarcity, and when you are in a condition of surplus, prices start falling and there are no real values. So you have to artificially keep prices up. There are two ways of doing this – firstly, leave capitalism and move into financial speculation, and secondly, control production in order to have artificial prices.

International capitalism, to great extent, has nothing to do with capitalism at all. We read about mergers and acquisitions, and the return of oligopolies. What you actually see at the international level is the return of pre-capitalism, which mercantilism, the return of trans-national corporations like the British East India Company. What is a mercantilist corporation? It is an international, horizontally integrated economic unit, which goes from the silkworm crosses, border after border, sea after sea, and manufacturing state after manufacturing state, until eventually it produces a silk curtain. What is interesting about it is the reason why Smith was against corporatism. It was because it lacked competition and it did not create wealth because things were not bought or sold. Over 50% of the incredible increase in trade today takes place within mercantilist corporations, and, therefore, without creating new and real wealth. Why? Because the only way you can deal with surplus production is to get rid of the competition and dispose of the surplus situation, which would cause prices to fall.

The underlying representation of this globalist period, which is now about 30-35 years old, was a theory that would lead to 'fuel' war and the weakening of governments, and resultantly, to the decline of the nation state. Since 1989 we have been observing the return of the nation state. I would say nation states are stronger today than they used to be in the 1950s. They have more power; the effect of their decisions is greater than it has been for a long time. One of the causes for this state of affairs is the breaking point of 1989, and the other cause was September 11th. From 1973 until 2001 Prime Ministers and Presidents, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, were increasingly convinced they did not have much power, because they accepted the globalist theory. Suddenly they woke up on September 12th and saw that their economies were collapsing, and discovered that the leaders of large corporations were rapidly cutting their investments because they saw an economic collapse coming. In about

**Capitalism is based on values and competition in a condition of scarcity, and when you are in a condition of surplus, prices start falling and there are no real values.**

six weeks, political and administrative leadership of countries around the world woke up and decided they needed to do something about that. They have printed money, interfered in market places, made speeches and they have succeeded. Having succeeded they have rediscovered their force, for better and for worse. Since 2001 all around the world one has been seeing political forces at the national and the regional level, starting to flex their muscles in a way they never did during the globalist period. The result was the return of nationalism.

We may say there are two kinds of nationalism – I call them positive nationalism and negative nationalism. There is an interesting theory of four types of government:

- Jacobin, which is revolutionary;
- Heroic, which is not heroic in a sense of people sacrificing themselves but more about an ethical leadership being sacrificial;
- Republicanism, which is in fact democracy and humanism;
- Louis-Phillipism, where power is held by people.

The fifth would be corporatism, and that would be a Mussolinian idea, which Hitler pretended to use. In Italy Mussolini was backed by a number of serious philosophers and economists, and they did put forward an alternative idea to Marxism, socialism, democracy, etc. It was corporatism, in which individuals do not exist as individuals, but as members of groups, by specialization. Western universities today are a perfect illustration and acceptance of the Mussolinian idea. It removes responsible individualism and the idea of the collective unconsciousness, and eradicates the possibility of the re-conceptualization of society by the citizens.

Today our societies are dominated by, on the one hand, Louis Phillipism, and on the other, corporatism. The combination of these two is more than enough to ensure the return of populism. In fact, it encourages the return of heroic populism. In that sense, one could say that we, the humanists, are responsible for this failure which has led to the return of populism, caused by a lack of transparency among humanists, of easy lateral communication, and by the loss of the ability to make people understand that doubt is good and can be combined with a sense of purpose and direction. Instead, citizens are left with the sense of an obscure specialized intellectual class, and specialized technicians, who are not even intellectuals.

What Mussolini once said may sound familiar and very modern: "The crowd does not have to know. It must believe... If only we can give them faith that mountains can

be moved they will accept the illusion that mountains are movable.' The trick of populists is that they are able to make the exceptional and the peculiar seem normal. They require a dysfunctional elite that is unable to respond to it, and they offer to replace this lack of clarity with the clarity of the Manichaeon type. A successful populist recognizes that human beings have very complicated characters, have their strengths and weaknesses, and what the most successful populist is able to do is to take their own weakness and to project it into the equivalent weakness in the population. It is an emotional relationship which populists are capable of forming. It has to do with love, it has to do with hate and fear, and it is very hard to struggle against because it bypasses everything else – it taps into our weaknesses, it panics us, releases fear, funnels debate from the complex and doubt into the Manichaeon, it creates unshaped emotion, and if it really goes badly, it turns to paranoia. Suddenly the crazy seems perfectly normal. We have had six years of that in the United States. In Canada the Populist Party is rising. We have seen it in France, Belgium, Austria, Australia, Thailand, Japan, and Central Europe. So, the key to populism and to negative nationalism is the failure of the humanist elite, a sense of undefined insecurity among the population, and poverty of different sorts. What is also important is a sense of ethnic belonging and loyalty, a certain pride in ignorance, and a conviction that you have been permanently wounded.

I think that one of the things that makes it very difficult for the contemporary elite to function, is that it has been caught up for a hundred years in a kind of anti-superstition ideology called rationality, and that you were either rational or irrational. The only alternate position was the romantic one. Since reason is all about conscious doubt, you could not deliver much to the citizens with that, so a sort of practical, instrumental reason was created, which actually had nothing to do with reason at all. Instrumental reason is utilitarianism, but that is what happens in ideologies – you glue things to them and people do not notice they have been tricked. The result of it was a rational language versus an irrational one. Consequently, the language has become reason versus unreason. And this, I have to say, is a profoundly anti-humanist position. It makes it virtually impossible to run a society and to live in a normal society, because it is so abstract that it is impossible for citizens to identify with it.

Non-reason is a real space, reason is a human quality. There are other human qualities of equal value: common sense, ethics, imagination, intuition and memory. They are all usable in various ways. Common sense and ethics are not a dependency of

**Non-reason is a real space,  
reason is a human quality.**

**In the European context the problem is that integration has been dominated by civil servants, business, politicians, and what a tiny role culture has played in putting Europe together.**

reason; they are independent human qualities. Unless we are able to take a much more balanced humanist approach, we will find ourselves constantly the victims of people like narrow economists.


In the European context the problem is that integration has been dominated by civil servants, business, politicians, and what a tiny role culture has played in putting Europe together. The Erasmus program is one of the greatest programs in Europe, and one of the greatest culture programs in the world. But it is called the Erasmus program not by accident. It is called so because Erasmus is a reminder of a pre-absolute approach towards reason. I am much more balanced in a broad humanist approach towards human qualities. That is my interpretation of why it is called so. It takes us back to other ways of imagining society, Europe and European societies.


After a few unfortunate instances in the 20th century, I cannot think of Europe as a continuation of the rational period. I think of it as largely bypassing a large part of the rational period, and returning to the high Middle Ages and Renaissance, when a very interesting view of Europe existed: Europe not as nation states primarily, but as a continent within which people with multiple personalities could exist. They could be of more than one language, have different religions and belong to different levels. This power existed in very complex multiple ways, and in essence that is the Europe of today, with the Renaissance part not worked on hard enough, because of the humanist failure to get the power in public life that is needed.

There is a thing in medicine called the multiple personality disorder. I think Europe and Canada suffer from it. In this context I would like to say that the use of the word multicultural is inappropriate because it was used at a certain time when people could not think how to describe such things. The concept of multiculturalism is essentially 18th-19th century Austro-Hungarian. It has nothing to do with complexity or multiple personalities, and people's capacity to adapt to complex situations. It is about fixing people in units, side by side. It is a catastrophic approach. So, I never use the word except to say that I do not use it. We have to accept it that the way the word multicultural has been used is to fall into a trap, it misses the Erasmusian capacity to be several things at once, to remain stable but constantly altering yourself and altering your society. It misses the basic humanist idea of relaxed positive tension, the right to live with doubt, to be transparent, to agree that social complexity is wonderful. We should be allowed to have more doubts and more positive tension, and people should be able to be more things at the same time. In other words,

the intellectual idea that actually reflects the way in which people actually live their lives is the idea of multiple personality. And it works, provided that there is positive nationalism, and a sense of civil purpose. None of that can work if economists, particularly this school of economists, continue to lead, because they cannot deal with complexity, and they cannot deal with doubt. This idea cannot work if the silos continue inside the universities, and it cannot work if social complexity is treated as something extremely difficult.

Professors and the heads of university departments will say 'We agree, but things are so complicated. Moreover, we do not have time to be more than a silo'. In 1900, according to the insurance industry, average life expectancy in the Western world was 50. The life expectancy of a child born today is 100. The life expectancy of students in this room is 90 on average, but we are still organizing ourselves on the basis of late 19th century economic and management structure, which was built around the idea that we all die at 50. There was a revolution in Western civilization in the late 18th century. There was another one in the late 19th century, and we have now done nothing intellectually interesting about reorganizing the way in which we live for the last 120 years. We are still functioning as if we did not have time, and therefore it must be narrowed and concentrated, whereas, in fact, we have approximately doubled the time we used to have, and therefore have the time to be both: specialist and humanist.





**Paul Gillespie**



**Janusz Majcherek**



**John Ralston Saul, Fredrik Barth, Unni Wikan**



**Paddy Coulter, Deidre McQuillan**



DEBATE I

# The Legacy of the Left – East- and West-European Perspectives

The posthumous life of the Left, or can Marx be saved?  
Postmodernism and other fashions: a new direction, or return  
into the old tracks?  
In search of alternatives  
'The Return of the Real?'

**Jacek Żakowski, moderator**

The subject of the debate is extremely difficult, not only because we are dealing with certain fuzzy ideas and concepts, but also because it is presented in a provocative manner. 'The legacy of the Left' – this title assumes that the Left is dead. I think such a thesis is incorrect. If I were to formulate this provocative sentence, I would use the expression 'what is given by the Left'. What has the Left done with this natural equity that it had? It passed over to others. The gigantic exchange that seemingly has been taking place is quite a phenomenon. It led to a situation, in many places in



the world, including Poland, that the Left took the place of the Liberals and the Right took the place of the Left by means of using a new formula that is sympathetic towards conservatism or nationalistic populism. These two concepts are intermingling. Still, the question is a gigantic one. Throughout the last ten years we have been writing and writing about this, but I do not think the subject has in any way been closed. This is the first intervention I want to make. The second is on the problem of the captive mind and the subject of it being revisited. Revisiting is quite clear here but we would not be able to touch upon it without the question of hegemony. We are talking about hegemonies which are always changing, fluctuating. This process that was described by Miłosz can be looked at in this particular context. In the context of mind giving in to hegemony. But in such a situation we would have some other interesting contexts as well: the post war years of communism and liberalism. In what Miłosz wrote we would also find a turn towards neoliberal hegemony. The new thing would be the new hegemony present at the beginning of this century the neo-conservatist hegemony. The Left is left empty-handed and flabbergasted. Here in Poland we might also discuss the wave of populist enslavements. We had such a period when the prevailing majority of politicians and people dealing with politics believed that the biggest problem in this world is terrorism. In Poland its substitute was the so-called 'system' or 'agent'. I would like to recall Polish situation when we face the attack of rightist populism. Leftist former Prime Minister Leszek Miller said that the answer to that situation was flat tax. This shows how deeply the Left was lost. Let's now face the question: what is the inheritance of the Left?

#### David Ost

I shall try to make some general remarks about the Left and how it has changed over time, as well as referring to some crisis it underwent.

I shall begin by saying that there are two general themes the Left always takes as its own. The first is inclusion and the second is progress. All Left activists try to include more and more people in collective decision-making and that is bound up with the notion of progress and belief in that in the first place. These two ideas of inclusion and progress came together at the time when the very Left emerged as concretely a Left, during the French Revolution. During it happened the inclusion of the third estate, a group that was outside of the clergy and the nobility, representing the new, rising class of market-oriented professionals and intellectuals emerging from the post-feudal, new class of society. The notion of progress was almost invented at the time of French Revolution; slogans saying we could reinvent, reshape the world were

**All Left activists try to include more and more people in collective decision-making and that is bound up with the notion of progress and belief in that in the first place.**

**Capitalism necessarily creates certain democratic oppositions pushing for the inclusion of greater number of people.**

very popular in those days. Progress was possible and we were not condemned to live constrained either by political or scientific limits. In a sense the entire French Revolution can be seen as the Left. This was the interpretation put forward by Edmund Burke. In opposition to this, as a reaction to this new Left and the idea of inclusion of the other into the collective decision making process, the notion of the Right was created. Burke saw the idea of a society in which everybody has their part in decision-making was dangerous, and for him society was inclusive in a sense that everybody was included, but not in the decision-making process. He was also against the notion of progress, and, consequently, in defence of tradition. And that set in place many of the terms that even now the Left and the Right distinguish themselves by. There was a conflict between the Right and the Left within the French Revolution and for the first time the issues of class appeared. The forces that, within the French Revolution, were seen as the Left came to a conclusion in a more expansive way, to include even the poor. This led to the distinction between the Jacobins on the one side and the Girondists on the other. The Right of this new French Revolution was hesitant about including more and more of the poor, seeing that as a threat to their notion of progress.

From this time on, the connection of class with economic issues become central to the Left. That became clear, perhaps above all, in Great Britain in the 1830's and 40's. Great Britain was at that time the most economically advanced country in the world and so the most class divided. Novelists such as Charles Dickens, and social theorists like Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels wrote about these class distinctions, and becoming the theorists of the Left formulated a definition of class based predominantly on the basis of the British experience. As the rest of the world joined the direction Britain set out, the issue of class became central to more and more people. Capitalism gave factory workers the resources to join and claim their rights, as it gave them the bit of education required to perform their duties efficiently and, moreover, workers were working and spending free time together. All that enabled them to learn and collectively act for their rights. Capitalism necessarily creates certain democratic oppositions pushing for the inclusion of greater number of people.

To say that class is central to the Left is not to say it is the only category that Marx left. What is the Left's attitude to big powers or states? Is it always opposed? We have been familiar with that for the last fifty years or so, because the Left was associated with anti-colonialism, third world struggles, anti imperialism. So there is the notion that the Left is always hostile to major powers, but of course that has not always been the case. Going back to the times of the French Revolution when many

of the Left were for Napoleon, as the one who was bringing new ideas of inclusion and progress throughout Europe. The idea of the revolution on the horseback and big power that led forces united. Karl Marx in his writings about India claimed that it was Great Britain that brought civilization and progress to India. He sees it as painful and tragic, but also necessary and inevitable. We also are aware of the connection of the Left with the Russian Revolution and the Soviet state. So, the Left can be, and most recently has been, anti-imperialist and anti large powers, but even nowadays we see some interesting developments. Some people on the Left have incorporated the War on Terror as a part of the Leftist ideology. They were 'enlightened' Leftists who saw fundamentalist religions such as Islam as such a threat that they decided to ally with the 'neo-conservatives' guided by President George W. Bush under the banner of spreading democracy all over the world. This leads us to another question: is the Left always anti-religious? It has usually been opposed to the established religions mainly because originally, when the Left came about, the religious leaders were the elite. So the Left has a long history of being opposed to religion, and yet, this is not a universal truth either. When religious groups are seen or interpreted as being oppressed by the same groups that promote class repression, the Left can be supportive of these groups. To take more recent examples; in the USA the Left had no problems in cooperating with the civil rights movements, which are promoted by religious movements. Martin Luther King Jr. has been accepted as a major figure on the Left, even though he is ultimately connected with religion. In Poland it is the way the Left made its peace; the decision to embrace the church was a turning point in the evolution of the struggle against the old communist system. In the 1970's, when the opposition that had seen themselves very self-consciously and explicitly on the left side, made it very clearly understood that the Catholic Church was against repression and saw themselves on the same side. They even saw the notions of inclusion and progress as compatible with greater rights for the Catholic Church than the Left was able to reach out. So, there are a lot of things that are conditional, and many things change in the notion of the Left.

Class has been the essential, enduring concept for the Left, at least from the 1830's. Since the 1970's it has been losing steam, but for over one hundred years class has been the dominating issue for the Left. What happened? In the early 20th century struggles over class became central throughout modern society. Some theorists questioned it, for example Ortega Y Gasset, a Spanish conservative thinker of the early 20th century who thought democracy was impossible because of urbanization and mass society, which is the rise of market-oriented, capitalistic society, and so, old,

**The Left can be, and most recently has been, anti-imperialist and anti large powers, but even nowadays we see some interesting developments.**

**In the post World War II period it became clear to the victorious capitalistic West that the issue of class could no longer be postponed.**

pre-urban communities were breaking down. As you had more and more people coming to a city and working in new businesses, class became an all-embracing issue. In other words, the conflicts of the 1830's were seen as widespread all over the world in the 1930's. At that point it was clear that class issues are going to be settled one way or another. The question was: how? People had alternatives being proposed such as fascism. Conservatives were at first scared by fascism because of its mass approach, but this was a conservatism for mass society to try to recreate unity, to include class anger and direct it to satisfy ethnic or racial issues. On the other hand there was communism that would try to address class anger in one way or another.

In the post World War II period it became clear to the victorious capitalistic West that the issue of class could no longer be postponed. It is worth remembering historically that while it is common today to say that communism has failed, it was equally common in 1945-1950 to say that capitalism had failed. Everybody believed that. It was a standard mantra. So, what happened is that the social-democratic experiences in the West of Europe, the more communist-oriented models in Eastern Europe led to class compromise and led to a period when the Left felt excluded, to a period of great economic growth for a long time. And yet, in the very basis of addressing class issues, it laid the ground for what emerged in the 1960's and 70's, namely the decline of class identity. In many ways it is a success of the class compromise that led to the erosion of its political strength. That is because less people felt the need to fight for class inclusion. Already by the 1960's, we see the rise of new types of social movements that are not based on class. Herbert Marcuse was the first to point to it in his book 'One dimensional man', in which he imagines that the working class, as a class, is highly incorporated into the system and yet, he says it is incorporation strictly according to economic rationales.

This was the time when other groups appeared seeking inclusion, and it was the slogan of the Left. In comparison with the need for inclusion of the minorities, women's groups etc., class issues seemed to be far less important.

In Eastern Europe societies, the situation looked different, since the communist party dominated the political scene. People increasingly rejected the notion of class over time, in the name of inclusion and progress. Workers rejected it too, for a variety of reasons. In the post-communist era, after 1989, one of the central aspects of this is when class is re-emerging. Before 1989 all groups could believe that the classless society was in their common interest, because all were employees of the state.

In a post-communist society, class re-emerges, but without language or history. You have the emergence of class experiences, and even the class discontent, but there is neither the language nor the tradition to organize this discontent. Appealing precisely to class experiences, which we see very much in the current election campaign, politics talks about the rich, about the net of interconnections between politicians and businessmen. The Left needs to re-establish a new notion of class that makes sense, because the old notion of white, male, working class physical labour does not organize people to the extent it did before. These are some of the tasks facing the Left today.

#### **Professor Michael Daxner**

I would like to start and finish with the year 1968. Firstly, in 1968 there were various attitudes across Europe which we cannot generalise. Secondly, we must speak of the very different 'Lefts', the very different phenomena which we bracket under the heading 'the Left'. Thirdly, there is a change in the Jewish perspective of what is Left and what is Right. The American Left in the 20th century was an invention of American Jewish communities. It is interesting because it has real global implications.

These days we celebrate the 80th birthday of Che Guevara. It is mentioned mainly in conservative newspapers. Everybody says Che failed, he was romantic, something like a cloud in the collective memory, nevertheless he is popular as never before, as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung claimed. What did Che bring as a message? None that we could bring over in a key note, we would need a seminar on Che and America and early globalism to understand it.

I live in the eastern part of Germany now, where there is a true nostalgia for the socialist stage. Of course, nobody is nostalgic for the so-called socialistic distribution of poverty and fear, but still there is nostalgia for the sub social solidarity amongst small social groups: families, clubs, refugees groups. Certainly, it is a provocation for my own history. Neither was Che of the Left in the sense you have described the genesis of being Left, nor was any socialist or communist state a really revolutionary Left establishment of what you could call the Marxist legacy.

Karl Marx was a clever man. He said capitalism is evolving in all circumstances; he never said socialism would do that. This was an erroneous deviation. It does not mean I would revive Marx in the way conservative economists today teach Marx. Marx is popular on the East Coast of the USA. It is not so in German universities for reasons I do not know.

**The Left needs to re-establish a new notion of class that makes sense, because the old notion of white, male, working class physical labour does not organize people to the extent it did before.**

**The anti-authoritarian lifestyle, horizontalisation of power, politicizing privacy and the generational conflict: this was important for Europe.**

Do not forget that 1968 was the end of the post-World War II period and the end of the supremacy of nation states. Spare me from the differentiation between nation and nation state, but certainly the so-called internationalism of 1968 was a clear attack on the nation state. The state was a so-called peak system. In Europe we imported it from the East Coast of the USA. We imported this modelling of politics in a way that the enlightenment and liberal argument would not have done. It was an input of a communitarian American basis into a system that was absolutely not ready to understand itself as a variety of value-based communities. Therefore, I strongly attack any notion of a European-American common interest and shared value basis. We are two very different systems. There are of course interfaces of joint interests too. You see this in almost every act of foreign policy after the immediate post-war period when the USA and Western European allies dominated and set the stage.

1968 was modelling reality. It was mixing morality and politics. Do not misunderstand me. Even then we were not so stupid as to say that policy-making or politics should not be based on morals. But logically and pragmatically acting based on certain effects and politics are two different things.

The third thing we imported and adopted was the ambiguity of the United States' hegemony on civilisation. This happened more in Central than in Western Europe (certainly this is not true for the UK). It was the Left that took over the American lifestyle: mass democracy was something positive and against the elitists' concept of vertical democracy in Europe. On the other hand, for the ruling elites of the US this was Vietnam, and now we cannot distinguish Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos. It was very interesting because it showed immediately after 1972 the split between China and Moscow, but this is another question.

Another thing is decolonisation and fighting against global imbalances. The anti-authoritarian lifestyle, horizontalisation of power, politicizing privacy and the generational conflict: this was important for Europe. It was about deciding where you wanted to belong. What happened before the 1960 in countries like Germany, Austria and the West of a clerical, conservative in post-lifestyle and afterwards changed everything to the better. On the other hand, today it is very fashionable to bash the 1968ers, and many republican things are being privatized by the imperative of morals: be vegetarian, think about the ecology, animal rights, etc. This is a negative heritage we have today and this is the populist share of the Leftist movement. We were also re-mythologising the Enlightenment. Being anti-bourgeoisie was a creed.

Of course, the Left has always said it is pro-situationist. What 1968 did not understand was that you cannot have situationism without the bourgeoisie and vice versa. This also leads to populism.

I have not been asked to tell the entire story of 1968. Only with regard to Karl Marx whom I read with less than religious appreciation. At least this person could write entire sentences without neoliberal abbreviations, and he was very careful with his footnotes. I think he was basically right in his view on capitalism, which will always and permanently turn over all circumstances. Because this is a catholic country I am sure all of you know Saint Augustine. He had a very interesting contention: is God creating the world permanently or did he create the-world and leave it? Karl Marx was on the side of those who said capitalism is recreating itself permanently, which is in contradiction with his laws of history. He was attacking Hegel, but at the same time he also had his own narrowness and he was certainly not right. He was certainly more right than wrong on alienation. Today Marx, together with Badiou, would construct an adequate, contemporary class theory where you do not have fixed relationships, but instead a positioning in social space. This is the most modern and most adequate theory possible to find.

We all need balance between freedom and equity, between liberties and our duties to the market — say our political leaders. In this respect, Marx should meet one person who was not his explicit friend, but was very appreciative — namely Hannah Arendt. For me the Left always means the prerogative of freedom. This sounds very liberal, but Hannah Arendt had a very good sentence which said that the purpose of all politics is freedom. What does this mean? If you go to the republican space, if you want to be a political person, you must fight for freedom. The opposition to this kind of individualised approach is still a strong legacy of the Left.

Let me close with another provocation. The new Left will never be like a socialist or communist replica. In different way, they are not going back to its renaissance, because you cannot go back although you can try a bit of re-surfacing of some of the elements. Because of the mistakes of the Left, the criticism of the reality was not per se wrong. The Left was more often wrong than not by its wide-angle perspective. It could not concentrate on the relationship between the concrete cause and a general solution. There are many problems nowadays: water shortages, AIDS/HIV problems. What you need to solve such problems is multilateral policies, and not policies laid by one state or empire. I think that George W. Bush would be seen in a totally different

**We all need balance between freedom and equity, between liberties and our duties to the market.**

**The strongest and most positive aspect of the mid-range, new Left concept would be doubt in any authority armed with truth.**

light if he had discussed his theories of exportation of democracy with the Security Council. I am sure even the Iraq policy would have been different.

A few days ago I attended a meeting where nine Nobel Prize laureates discussed with Chancellor Merkel and some scientists the issue of the climate change. All the American Nobel laureates said that the decision on taking joint actions, and multilateral policy on this matter would be much easier after the change of the President of the US. This almost unpatriotic behaviour is a very good sign that the Left is not dead.

There are two more things that are interesting for the Left: in the future it will not believe in the laws of history. The Left has discovered other ideological and theoretical streams contingency. Things are what they are but they can be different. This is a sentence that forty years ago would have been difficult for the Left, and for the Moscow or Beijing it would have been impossible. What the Left has helped to become stronger is civil society. It is no longer hoping for the death of the state but has learned its lesson and now knows that for a strong civil society we need a strong state. I think we would get into more than one argument over whether this state would be a nation state or not. It might be important if we consider arguments relating to the European Treaty and whether we are on our way to a kind of United States of Europe.

As the world in the eyes of some people starts with the creation, so the last aspect is religion. The present Pope has written a letter of global importance wherein he warned people against relativism. This shows what will be the agenda for the Left. If an institution, the Pope, etc. says relativism is wrong, then there is probably some truth in relativism. This is an assumption. The strongest and most positive aspect of the mid-range, new Left concept would be doubt in any authority armed with truth. Due to the moral conviction that we can tell good from evil. Solidarity is the signifier of the Left, unity is the signifier for the Right. We have a choice between the two.

#### **Professor Andras Lanczi**

So many things have been said this morning. Firstly, the question is: what is the Left today. We were given a historical description from inside, not from a critical point of view, but emphasising the positive sides. This is not my view of the Left.

It seems that everything belongs to the Left today that is compatible with morality or moral values. I do not really know what the Left means. I agree it is the opposition

of the Right. As long as somebody claims to be a Leftist, we will have to treat the Left seriously. Nowadays the Left is too eclectic. Originally, it had two ideas: inclusion and progress. All these reference points or doctrines seem to have evaporated. We are very reluctant to say what progress is. Professor Daxner told us that in the future the law of history will be no longer important. I think it is a crucial point for the Left. Let me remind you Professor Kołakowski's book on the main paths of Marxism. His central thesis was that it was Marx who claimed to have found the law of history. In practice it turned out to be nothing else than historical determinism, just the opposite of freedom. Historical determinism still plays its role. Just look at the post communist world.

People in 1989 in the post communist world were told that communism and communist decisions were wrong and had not worked. Then, they were convinced that the capitalism was superior to central planning. Secondly, that communism is a system inferior to democracy. Still, these are the two legitimised forces of the post communist world. In this world people know only what it was mentioned before. They have no idea what Marx or Lenin did, they are just names to them. What they have preserved is historical determinism, but this time there is something more than this: it is globalisation that seems to be inevitable, and we have to take part in it.

The Left should give an account of communism. It is not just a derailment of history. It was made by people thinking about history, science, development and culture. I do not think we are over these ideas. The Left might defend itself by admitting that they were just the ideas of Marx, etc. but they had an impact on imagination and people. The problem is that it is a utopia. The problem is that we might talk about an egalitarian society and equality, and say that in the future we are going to have a different Left, but I do not think any promises for the future are unchallengeable ideas. This is part of the problem of the West. What does the good life look like according to the Left and Westerners?

Marx was the first man to say that philosophers were only interpreting the world in different ways, but our duty was to change it. In my opinion, he was right. In one sentence he undermined the roots of tradition of European education, erudition and all that we have been missing today. What has changed? In the USA philosophy is confined within academia and is analytical. If you are not an analytical philosopher, you cannot claim to be a philosopher. Hopefully, this is not the case in Europe. What is it if not a work in progress? I do not think any ideas ever born in European culture should be put on the shelf because somebody wants to change the world. What we need is just time.

**The Left should give an account of communism.**

**The most sensitive issue is truth. If we deny that truth really exists, nothing of the sense of the fundamental issues is understood.**

I would like to give you a list of Leftist ideas and comment on them. Progress was wrong and so was historical determinism. The next idea is revolution. Until the appearance of the new Left in the 1960's, revolution was part of the Leftist programme. People wanted to change the world by means of revolution. 1989 and the collapse of the communist world was not a revolution for sure, because communism surrendered. The communists had no idea what to tell the people; big ideas were over. On the other hand, the rest won the game, so all you have to do is just follow the rest. Revolution is out of the question. The next thing is class. There was a very particular way of understanding class in the communist period. The Left was not for the working class. Class is just one way of interpreting society. I do not think it has any relevance as an intellectual interpretation form in Western and Central Europe. The next thing is the future. We are living under the condition of the end of history. We have nothing to say about the future. The Left no longer claims to be the salvation of mankind.

The most sensitive issue is truth. If we deny that truth really exists, nothing of the sense of the fundamental issues is understood. In the zethetic sense of approaching the truth, we are always on the road to understanding what the truth is. It does not mean, however, that there is no truth.

I was very pleased to read an interview with Habermas, who said that the roots of European culture lay in Christian-Jewish culture. Everything else is just post-modern discourse. Habermas returned here to the original problem of our identity as Europeans. If it is the Left that contributes to the realisation of European identity, I would welcome a dialogue with the Left about it.

The problem is that in my home country, in Hungary, this kind of panel would not have taken place. It would be impossible to have representatives of the Right and Left sitting and talking about the future. Why is it impossible? Because all the promises connected with the shift from the communist period have been exhausted. According to the average Hungarian, capitalism is not superior to any other economy and democracy is just a pseudonym for a chaotic political community. We are on the verge of almost turning back, which, fortunately, is impossible.

We would like to abandon ideology. All of us are living in a post communist world, also those who live in the UK or France, or Canada. In the post communist world, and in the modern world as well, ideology is just a means of bridging the gap between the

elite and the masses. In Hungary, every Hungarian, every day, sits down and watches TV for 4-5 hours. They live in a virtual world where almost everything that is transmitted to them is accepted. Therefore, they are prisoners of different ideologies. In our culture people used to have faith in ideology. So they have today.

#### **Professor Zdzisław Krasnodębski**

My first thesis will be a polemic with Mr Żakowski and his introductory sentence. I would like to say that true Left is gone. There is this popular Polish song by Maryla Rodowicz: Today There Are No True Gypsies No More. There are still people who have Leftist ideas, but the true Left is no more.

What is the true Left? I am sentimental about it because it makes me go back to my youth. When, 40 years ago, you went to the West, you saw an appalling contrast between Poland and the rest of Europe. At the Free University in Berlin you would see groups of people giving out leaflets, Trotskyites, Maoists, feminists; you would see groups of students reading Marx just like some sects read the Bible, some of them were using Freudian theory in practice trying to overcome the Oedipus complex. I have many friends from this generation. Now they are political leaders and outstanding intellectuals. They all agree that these were the times of fanaticism. If I read the intellectual output from these times, I wonder how these people could write and publish such texts. For example, there is a very good and beautiful book 'Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967 bis 1977' (The Red Decade. Our Little German Cultural Revolution 1967 to 1977) written by a Maoist writer, Gerd Koenen, describing how in the 1970s in Berlin activists were collecting money for Polish KOR (The Committee For The Defence of Workers) and Pol Pot simultaneously. He is trying to explain this phenomenon.

That kind of Left is gone. Sometimes I think about my youth with nostalgia. We can say one thing about that 'old' Left was sexy, powerful and there were people who would die for those ideas. Some actually did die, some did kill. That kind of Left does not exist any more. I discovered it at the beginning of my career, when Étienne Balibar came to Bremen. In those days Bremen University was one of the most Leftist universities in Germany. In his lecture Balibar spoke about Europe and globalisation.. At one point he apologised and quoted Marx. I realised it was the end of a certain era.

When we ask what happened to these captive minds, I can tell you that, from my experience, many of my friends from that period worked later on for the university

administration. Later bureaucrats turned out to be former revolutionists. This generation was very sensitive to power, it broke through to the centre of power and they took it over. Not only in Germany, but also all over Europe, you can trace careers and biographies of such people. The example can serve in the case of Gerhard Schröder or Joschka Fischer.

What are students like today? I think they are slightly conservative. Zygmunt Bauman wrote about post-modernism as a source of pain. In my opinion they are suffering in a similar way that Bauman described in his book. Anthony Giddens, on the other hand, wrote that relations between people are based on their free choice. So students have free choice: they know that relationships mean not only the accumulation of freedom but are also related to suffering, because these relationships break up. Romantic love exists only when one is 18 or 20, later the pattern of romantic love no longer exists. Old professors from that period are trying to recollect the old heroic times, but still they feel that it is all gone.

#### **The true Left, with its power to attract the mind, is no more.**

The true Left, with its power to attract the mind, is no more. I know that not all my Western friends would agree with this statement, but I think we were the ones to change it. Here, in the East you could hear this struggle in the writings of Herling-Grudziński and Miłosz; in the West, it all happened in Parisian salons. In the West intellectuals did not understand us, and we had a feeling of superiority over the West. We were the ones to pursue and see the true reality. I tested it on myself. I always liked to be a kind of alien when abroad. When I was in Germany or France, it was interesting for me to observe that reality from the perspective of a stranger. I was meeting friends, they were asking me about my Solidarity badge; I was telling them about it, they were very interested in it. But I had the feeling of losing my sense of reality and after three months I did not know what to stick to. I returned to Poland and I discovered there was no true Left left. But I discovered reality by opening Trybuna Ludu daily and going to Warsaw, to Ursynów neighbourhood to see what my quarter looks like. I knew where the truth lay where the illusion ended and reality started.

What happened to captive minds after this great victory of ours in 1989? What was it like on our side? We lost our feeling of superiority. You can find it in Miłosz's writings. Another question is whether, after 1989, we had our minds freed? I am not sure if a mind can be truly free or liberated. I am not sure if it is a natural state of mind to be liberated. In post communist states, we found out that the mind, or

intellect was not really necessary, because we had been told that everything had been solved. It was a kind of imposed thoughtlessness. Today we know what Poland is like and we have political disputes about it. The fact that we are arguing about it and the fact that even the idea of civil society is not dogma, is interesting. What fell down was hegemony, monopoly. It was not only about manipulation, because we had good answers to certain issues and problems. This new situation means accumulation of freedom an opportunity to think about new problems. We can broaden the discussion, but we know our local problems.

What happened in the West? The European Left became americanised. Professor Daxner mentioned that there have been always shifts and flows regarding morality and communitarians in the West. In the book 'A Tale of Two Utopias' Paul Berman writes that the 1968 movement in the USA was the result of Marxist ideas coming from Europe. He claims that the ideas of 1968 came true in 1989 in Central Europe. What does the Americanisation of the European Left mean? It is liberalised. This was explained to me by a Leftist friend from Germany. You can easily tell a former Maoist from a former communist. Communists are now liberal, and Maoists read Hannah Arendt. Liberalisation is about the weakening of the message: supporting free markets and individualism, but in a soft version. The first Solidarity was about domination of politics, and then domination of the economy came. We all see that today's liberalised Left is trying to combine the criticism of globalism with a defence of its lifestyle. Someone mentioned that the emancipation of middle class women in New York is only possible thanks to women from Eastern Europe, who help them in everyday duties. The situation in Europe is similar, and we see this contradiction in any Western European country. Because of this discrepancy, immigrants are left alone and do not take part in the discourse. Minorities are not taken into consideration, and they are not included in the prevailing discourse.

There is a new orthodoxy emerging right now, values and notions such as humanism in Europe. There is a certain set of notions that bring good associations, such as a civil society. If you say you are a nationalist – what about that? You talked about negative and positive nationalism, but they have not been explained. Definitely, nationalism brings about negative connotations. People from the Right and Left are trying to undermine these orthodoxies connected with connotations, but it is not an easy process to implement.

The last problem I would like to mention is the situation of forgetting about the important questions in Europe. In Europe important, but inconvenient, questions are

**This new situation means accumulation of freedom an opportunity to think about new problems. We can broaden the discussion, but we know our local problems.**

brushed aside. The same is true with countries with problems, such as Poland, which ask uncomfortable questions, which then results in them being pushed away.

#### **Jacek Żakowski**

I still have not found the answer to the following question: if we look at the last several decades, there is a thesis that the Left collapsed due to their own guilt. In the West, they are not as effective as they used to be, and in the East they compromised by turning into totalitarian regimes. Now the totalitarian regimes are over and, in fact, there is no East, there is only the West in this part of Europe. And so we see tensions rising leading to the development of Rightist thinking and political ideas. My question is this: is this really the testimony of the Left since the Left is dead? Or maybe this period of political experiments means that the Left will not stop quarrelling with the Right and that there will still only be implementation of Left programmes in Right programmes? As far as Poland is concerned: how about dividing Poland into two political parties: conservative liberal and the left party? We still do not see how would this function. What do you think of this?

#### **David Ost**

I think what is important, and what Jacek Żakowski is pointing to is that the conflicts between the Left and the Right come up and are articulated, but in a different way. There are plenty of articles in the Polish press about how the Right wing party is in reality leftist. In Hungary the situation is the same. Yes, Right and Left come out in many different versions. I agree there is no one single Left and that the Left has changed over time. Zdzisław Krasnodębski told us about this. I agree with almost everything he said, but do not know what is supposed to come out of that. We understand the situation which the Left is in, we understand why class issues have become secondary and we understand the problem the Left is in, and now we face a period of time when the Right is dominant. I think it is going to last for a while and there are still plenty of opportunities where you can cut down on these class distinctions because of globalisation and the importation of workers, as Professor Krasnodębski pointed out. Poland gets help as an economically improving country, but I am sure that in a few years time Poles will rail against Chinese workers who will be taking our jobs.

We are still living in a time when these economic aspects of globalisation and these opportunities are there, and they are going to disorient the Left for a while. Globalisation laid the grounds to re-establish the kind of global class compromise that

Keynesianism established on a local scale. Globalisation creates the basis for re-establishing the Right is in the driving seat. This is why it is important to re-conceptualise what class conflict means, because it is not what the old Left claimed it was.

**Andreas Lanczi**

It is intriguing what it means to be a Leftist or Rightist. For me it has only a contextual meaning. What are the issues in different countries that seem to divide society into Right and Left? Is it the economy? I do not think so. There is much difference between the republican and democratic parties' policies. Social benefits? Yes, but in this case it is just the proportion that is being debated. The issues that really matter belong to private lives: homosexual marriages, religious issues and so forth. To your question I have only another question in response, not an answer. Are we not also captive in this sense, that it is either Coca Cola or Pepsi, or the republican or democratic party? Is Europe a cultural target for other cultures? This is what bothers me.


**Zdzisław Krasnodębski**

Today's Left is not capable of solving the class problem. At a certain point in time it was said that the basic problem has already been solved, so the Left will deal with cultural issues. It is not like that. Leftist ideology is all about representing the ideology of the model classes. For instance, the Green Party is a party of students and university professors. If we look at the contradiction and tension in society, you can see it in New York: there is the middle class, and the hard-workers who never go to restaurants. There is no solidarity. Top models and Turkish girls have completely nothing in common, they may tolerate each other, but they have nothing to say to each other. I have observed it from quite a close distance: my was attending a German grammar school where there were Turkish girls. It never happened that a Turkish girl would be invited to her party, because they have nothing to say to each other. If they started talking to each other, they would probably end up having a fist fight. So there was a lack of solidarity. We should create some sort of community. It is usually created by referring to tradition and history, certain common symbols, to something that unites. We refer to pride and guilt. This is what helps us to nourish solidarity.


**Globalisation laid the grounds to re-establish the kind of global class compromise that Keynesianism established on a local scale.**







**Jan Sowa**



**Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka, Aleksander Koj**




**András Láncki**



**Oleksandr Hrycenko**



**László Rajk, Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick, George Kolankiewicz**



VD  
VILLA  
DECIUS

DEBATE II

# Talking to the Wall: the East-West Apartheid in Europe's Intellectual Life

1968: Two revolutions and two oppositions  
Barbarians in the garden: on the East in the West  
Post-modernity and the fate of Humanism

**Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick**

There is a kind of a divide that has been haunting Europe today since at least the times of enlightenment and I would like to explore some of the less explored sources. Let me start on a dramatic note, from the moral and intellectual knock-out I got on 31 May 2003, when I opened three or four major European newspapers and I discovered that an article called 'What Europe' had been published by Derrida and Habermas – two leading European philosophers – about the Europe they have been dreaming about. The article has been provoked by European demonstrations against the American invasion of Iraq in all European cities. Derrida and Habermas suggested that it is now time to establish a founding event of a new European public sphere and identity. What was striking to me is that neither gentleman mentioned that there has already been a founding event of the new European identity, namely the 1980

revolution in Poland, promulgated by Solidarność, which culminated in 1989's Autumn of the Nations. That was what I have always thought was the founding event, the biggest anti-totalitarian revolution in the world, a peaceful transition to democracy that Europe should be proud of and should be marking and treating as a kind of a starting point of a new life and more human existence. It is ironic that Habermas and Derrida did not see anything constructive in the events that Hannah Arendt would consider as the fulfilment of her dreams about this ideal revolution leading to *novum ordo seculorum*. It would be a sort of fulfilment of her civic aspiration. Even more ironically – if not suicidally – that Polish intellectuals themselves are denouncing and renouncing their revolution – more, they are lambasting it today in what has become a great masochistic rite of national self-debasement. It was said yesterday that no intellectuals had a successful revolution. It is not true. The Eastern Europeans were the first ones to do it. But today they have committed a unique patricide and killed their own revolutionary fathers and the tradition they had created.

The East - West divide has had a long tradition; I won't go into retelling what Larry Wolff says in his very influential masterwork 'Inventing Eastern Europe'. What I would like to refer to is that Eastern and Western intellectuals have been two intellectual communities that have for a long time been talking past one another. In countless publications belonging to so-called postcolonial studies and the fashionable genre called 'The Empire Talks Back', East-Central Europe has been figured as an anomalous zone. Western radical thinkers, in their debunking of imperialism, orientalism or ethnocentrism, found their allies in the former colonies of the West rather than among the wretched of the earth in the Soviet empire. There were various reasons for that occlusion, also various exceptions like Timothy Garton Ash's masterful essay collection 'The Uses of Adversity' and our colleague David Ost's studies of Solidarność. There is a plethora of interesting books or scholarly analysis of the enlightenment movement on the way it has become dehumanised; for example, 'Seduction of Unreason' by Richard Wolin and Mark Lilla's 'Reckless Mind', which are only repeating what Czesław Miłosz said in his 'Captive Mind' back in the 1950s. They are pointing to the intellectual romance with totalitarianism and intellectual 'tyrannophilia' and finding out how this 'tyrannophilia' destroyed the humanist movement in Europe. Let me mention some reasons that are very seldom applied to this East - West apartheid. One is an incommensurability – or untranslatability – of experience. The second may be ecological and aesthetic: Let's admit it: socialism in the Eastern European style has never had the wild, sexy, carnival-esque quality of the tropical communism of, for instance, Cuba. It has been a sad, northern European

**The East - West divide has had a long tradition.**

socialism, born out of a rape and in a wretched climate. Just to illustrate it let me recall a satirical drawing published in 'Tygodnik Powszechny' showing an elderly gentleman toiling across a desolate, half ruined landscape of an unfinished Soviet-style housing development, smashed windows, broken water mains, fallen telegraph wires and with water soaking through his shoes. The man is repeating, through gritted teeth: we belong to Europe, we belong to Europe, we belong to Europe!

In one of the most beautiful poems of the communist era, 'The power of taste', Zbigniew Herbert has captured the often occluded aesthetic aspect of the struggle against communism, which was also a struggle against ugliness. There is a sort of invisible orientalism. We have one orientalism, as studied by Edward Said, based on the West constructing the silent, unmanageable, ungovernable, wild, primitive Asia; and there is an invisible orientalism, which has not been properly studied, going back to the times of Voltaire and based on the 'invention' of Eastern Europe as the same silent, ungovernable, wild and primitive region. Compared with the empires of Prospero and Caliban, this was Caliban's empire, the other was Prospero's: so we need to study more the empire of Caliban.

At a conference in Warsaw Ewa Thompson discussed her recent book 'Imperial Knowledge', and was at great pains to demonstrate that Poland is a victim of the imperial project and qualifies as a subject for postcolonial study. You would not believe the massive assault that her presentation provoked among Polish historians and political scientists in Warsaw. She was accused of striving to be fashionable, misunderstanding the essence of colonialism and getting it all wrong. One of the participants – a very respectable scholar – claimed that Poland has never been colonised and she would not dare compare us to those negroes. What was fascinating was not Thompson's scholarly scenario but the protest, which I read as the utmost triumph of Sovietism. The fact that the Poles did not see themselves as comparable to the 'negroes' is a testimony that Sovietisation has really been successful.

How to transcend this divide – there are two possible scenarios – one has been exercised already by our wonderful inspiration, 'viagra' of the Left, Slavoy Žižek, a Slovenian intellectual who has been a source of great excitement to both my Norwegian and international students and a new icon of the Left and of 'Le Monde Diplomatique'. Žižek, as we know, marries Stalin to Lacan and glorifies joyful violence. But everybody loves him as the great renovator of the Left. In the beginning I was enraged and exasperated: has everybody gone totally gaga? But then I realised that

actually the phenomenon called Žižek is worth studying because he is the first intellectual after Lenin, who actually has re-dignified Eastern European socialism, made it sexy and romantic, and even commercial. As nobody else before, Žižek talks back to the Western Left in the language the Left understands. If we read him carefully, he secretly laughs at the Left, relishing in the acrobatics that reveal the Left's infantile disorders. The other way to transcend the East-West rift is to focus on the intellectual tradition which is there and to which the West is returning. I call it oppositional humanism or the Second Renaissance in the heart of Europe. The Renaissance which was the re-enchantment of modernity, which was going back both to the modern and pre-modern project, which needs the closer scrutiny.

#### **László Rajk**

I would refer a little bit to yesterday's debate because I think some very important elements were left out from the Left as such. One is internationalism, which is a very important element of the Left. I do not want to go back to the history but let's say to Americans and the French; the new United States and France interrelationship. By international I would mean international solidarity or ideological solidarity, which is, for instance, the American revolution, the revolution in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century, the Paris Commune, the Spanish Civil War, all the Leftist intellectual movements in the young Soviet Union. I think it is a very strong element in the Left movement and I would say unique. I do not see such strength in conservatism on the international field. Why I am mentioning international ideological solidarity? Because it leads us to 1968 and what happened after the fall of the Berlin wall.

Another element – which was already touched on and mentioned but was not stressed enough and is very important to the Leftist movement in 1968 and later on – is sex. Sex based on the utopian end of 19th century communes, revived in the 1960s and 1970s in movements in the United States, Europe, etc. It was present in the early fundamentalist communist era and is very important if we are trying to arrive at 1968. The third element is the media, mass-media – here they cannot refer back to the 19th century or earlier, but to the 1960s, most probably because of the Leftist intellectuals who were engaged in journalism at the very start of the real mass-media. We started to perceive philosophers as rock stars, like Sartre, it is an absolute creation of the media. No one can claim that Sartre was on the philosophical Left and it is very unique in history, the history of culture, the history of philosophy that someone becomes such a star.

These are the three elements which are roots of the early Leftist movement, lead us

**The other way to transcend the East-West rift is to focus on the intellectual tradition which is there and to which the West is returning. I call it oppositional humanism or the Second Renaissance in the heart of Europe.**

**The East European political movements starting around the end of the 1960s and later turned towards the mass-media.**

to the end of the 20th century and can help us to explain what the differences and the common overlapping parts in the history of 1968 in the East and West. It is obvious that differences exist but what is important is where the stresses were put in different countries and which elements and which events were more or less politicised. We are very proud of 1968, we see this as European event but I see it as American, it is an import from the USA, from the university life of the United States. Moreover, if we recall the events in Germany, these are identical copies of those in US universities. This is the kind of warning that should alert us that we should be careful with this entire American attitude, which was generally in the 1960s very typical for Europe. The East European political movements starting around the end of the 1960s and later turned towards the mass-media. Just think about two very strong events – 1968 and the Polish revolution. Result – *liberación* *Gazeta Wyborcza* which is a very important, influential participant of this revolution. This is a kind of promise for the future. It is not only an experiment but also a very successful attempt at business; which is more or less atypical for revolutionaries. Even Adam Michnik and his French friends are a little bit shy of saying 'I am a multimillionaire and I am very successful at the business of making a journal'. Because of romanticism, of certain heritage that we want to maintain, of this poverty, etc. we are shy to see some important points and, I think, they are much more important common and overlapping points than contradictive points.

#### **Paddy Coulter**

*Gazeta* as a successful business that is shocking in circles on the Left. I remember a conference about media in South Africa in the early 1990s where it was talked about *Gazeta* being that kind of successful business which was considered completely to boom. Decent people would not bring up the idea of having a successful enterprise. Let's move to another political perspective. Stanislav Shushkevych is a key political figure. For those of my generation I would never have believed that we would have seen the dissolution of the Soviet Union without tremendous bloody upheaval. I just found the scenario in which you were a participant of this event. For somebody like me, born after the Second World War, just unconceivable, unimaginable and that you are both witness and player.

#### **Stanislav Shushkevych**

I am going to talk about an average intellectual in Belarus at least to the extent I know them and the only thing I can say is that we have highly educated intellectuals in Belarus but our intellectuals work at a totally different level. I always start by saying that the Belarussian intelligentsia has been destroyed. It was a process of

**Belarussian intelligentsia has been destroyed.**

destruction which started with the tsar 200 years ago and continued during the World War II. It is actually easy to compare – the United States of America lost three hundred thousand US citizens during World War 2 but their population was two hundred million; yet we lost 2.5 million people having less than ten million in general. It was the complete destruction of our intelligentsia. We joke by saying that we are those wretched intellectuals who drag their legs through a desert. We all say we are Europeans - even our president says that he is a European although he is an Asian – although he cannot be compared to Asians either. So how does it happen? We have not had any contact, any experience with free information. In fact we still do not have access to information from the free mass media, newspapers or business newspapers. Any sources of mass information are banned in Belarus, censorship is quite strict. Just look at our so-called free newspapers – there are free newspapers but they are forced to print the articles they print. Even if we have intellectuals they find it extremely difficult to operate under our legislation, which is quite inhumane, and many of them simply left.

I used to be a deputy rector for education and promotion at the largest state university in Belarus. Our humanists were all Marxists or Leninists by education because they were forced to study scientific communism, political economics and they were also forced to study Marxist or Leninist philosophy. And up until today all Ph.D.s are historians, economists or political scientists ('political scientist' is an unknown word in Belarus). They all forgot about the fact that 200 years ago we were a European country and our intelligentsia is not aware of its historical role, does not realise its political role. Our intelligentsia has been told that they are somewhere between the classes, that they are not a political power.

The only Western influence in Belarus today is through American movies, through Hollywood. The Internet is available and you can find lots of information there, but you do not have access to free sources of information and the voice of community is not heard. I think that most of structures of the civil society were developed by the secret service, just to show off, just to say to the West, yes, we have civil society structures and these NGOs successfully apply for grants. Here in Poland we are very well understood and Poles seem to understand us much better than others and often invite Belorussian intellectuals to Poland. Our intelligentsia, generally speaking, does not realise what its political role is and this is mainly due to the information blockage. I am a physicist by education and, as the moderator has mentioned, I did have my say in the stoppage of the activities of the Soviet Union, but I was not an academic in those days. I did not

**The only Western influence in Belarus today is through American movies, through Hollywood.**

**If there is no opposition in Russia, there is no freedom of speech or the freedom of ideas.**

know about the Human Declaration in 1950 and I was not aware of the Union of Steel and Coal in Europe. I had no idea about military and political cooperation in Europe. I did not know about the beginnings of the European Community. I did not know about the six founding states of the European Community.

Insofar as our intellectual level has not changed a lot, we are quite backward not only in political sciences but also on a technological level. For instance, if you want to produce one ton of steel in Ukraine you have to use six times as much energy as in Luxembourg, which is quite astounding. As far as Belarus is concerned it is just the same – you need six times more energy in order to coax our intellectuals to improve on their qualifications. It means that you need to work six times harder with Belorussian intellectuals to allow them to reach the level of today's Western intellectuals. I am not saying that our intellectuals are stupid or undereducated. It is just this matter of access to information.

We are discussing very interesting issues such as: what shall happen with humanism? Actually we have to study the word humanism and look in the dictionary to see just what humanism does mean. The theocentric system as it used to be in the middle ages in Europe has been reinstated in Belarus today, but instead of the notion of God we have the notion of a president who cooperates with the Orthodox Church. Quite recently the second most important person in the Orthodox Church said that we should not be knowledgeable in history and law, that we should simply glorify those who did a lot for the motherland. It means that he discards the lives of the thousands of those who lost their lives and that we cannot write about history and its awareness. I wrote a letter to the Kirill, the metropolitan of Smolensk and Kalinin-grad, saying that I did not like his words and I disagreed with him. He wrote back to me that some historians, like Karamzin, would be treated as politically correct while others are not. Then I wrote back and said that we cannot actually introduce the notion of correct history because, if we look at the Russian authorities, power and Russian religion, the Orthodox Church and power always go hand in hand. Look at Yedinaya Rossiya (United Russia) – it is the party that totally eliminated the Russian opposition. If there is no opposition in Russia, there is no freedom of speech or the freedom of ideas. Some limited freedom still exists there but not within the major political parties but within smaller intellectual groups.

**George Kolankiewicz**

Those who have been reading Miłosz would recognise one point where he says that

Eastern intellectuals' attitude to the West has always been one of disappointed love. I hope none of you feel this that after my presentation. The West's attitude towards Eastern intellectuals has always been one of pleasant surprise and I must admit that this has been maintained in my first visit at Villa Decius.

What I would like to do is to address three questions very quickly. One is of a personal nature. I was trained as a sociologist in English and I would like to address the question of 1968 in the UK. I suspect I was invited because I am probably old enough to have taken part in the manifestations of the 1968. So I have some sense of feeling worse off at that time in the UK and it was a useful antidote to what was happening in Paris, the explosion of consciousness in 1968 in Warsaw or subsequently in Czechoslovakia.

Second, I would like to go to the point about the sense of loss, of waste. One of the great things about 1968 in sociology training that we will see in the experience of 1968 was that most of us did not go off and waste our time for the subsequent 40 years following the whole series of intellectual blind alleys which have left us in the kind of impasse Nina discussed. But I am hoping that perhaps meeting something like this emerging from a fruitful synergy between Eastern and Western intellectuals will show us a way out.

And third, very briefly and gently trying to point out the kind of convergence between Eastern and Western intellectuals that should not be happening, the kinds of topics we should not be sharing because there are the wrong kinds of topics, dealing with the wrong kinds of problems that we face in the world today.

Preparing for this conference I looked through memoirs of sociologists and social scientists in a collection called "The Disobedient Servant". It is very interesting that some of those sociologists were with me at university in Leeds. I wear the tie of the University in Leeds not because I am an old-school tie but actually because it reminds me of the occupations of 1968. But it is important what happened in 1968 – there were two ministers of Her Majesty's government who took part in the same occupation as I did. One of them subsequently is still in power and supports the invasion of Iraq and the other, who did not support the occupation, actually then resigned because of the question of Iraq. They called themselves the disobedient generation, not revolutionary, not radical. What was important about 1968 was the introduction of disobedience into society. This generation was brought up not on Marx, Jung or others. This generation was brought on Max Weber. It was the generation that took

**Eastern intellectuals' attitude to the West has always been one of disappointed love.**

**We have seen intellectual challenges being reduced to questions based around trust.**

issue with the real questions of power, legitimacy, domination. It was a generation that had been underpinning it. The key question raised by a man – Piotr Sztompka at least refers to him in his most recent book – Alan Dore, who indicated that sociology was about the way in which people impose meaning upon the world, seek to control it and in that sense seek to change it on the basis of values that they adopt. The history of sociology and social sciences for the 40 years following is a total and absolute loss of that sense of purpose in that direction. When students occupied universities in 1968 it was not a case of horizontalism. It was reappropriation of institutions. It was introducing forms of governments that had dominated student and academic life in 1968. In that sense, despite what people call it – that it was something which was tangential to the real questions of life – for students it was an attempt which succeeded in changing the governing structures of universities, where students can address a vice-chancellor across the table as an equal in that university. Did that happen in Eastern Europe? If it did, what would be the consequences?

The UK university system produced hundreds of thousands of people at that time and one of the consequences of that is the way in which it would have promulgated everyday industrial management life. What was important was that this reappropriation was very much in a way like peasants reappropriated land – they walked around to show that it was theirs to feel it. In the same sense we discussed, we lived in, we danced, etc. within university buildings. For many those who actually led it were anarcho-syndicalists because they found a total loss of the theoretical direction that would allow them to impose that sense of control on the world around. They were aware, as Jeffrey Alexander says, that for the most of the working class, questions of the dull compulsion of economic relations, of everyday life are what they have to conform to. But they were being disobedient, unpredictable. What had they been doing? If you address the real questions of domination, they were challenging the legitimacy of the system as it existed at that time. We have lost any sense of questions to do with power, domination, legitimacy, duty, obedience, discipline. The way in which societies are governed. We have seen ourselves moving towards, paradoxically, and it is the point I am most concerned with. We have seen intellectual challenges being reduced to questions based around trust. If I see one of the greatest Polish sociologists spending his time writing a fantastic book on trust having spelt out in the introduction that he should really have liked to have written a book on power and yet in the index there is not any single reference to power. Where is this convergence? If we focus on trust we will begin doing what sociologists of the 1960s fought against. Do not allow concerns to become imperatives in your sociology. Just

because we are concerned about trust and distrust, just because we worry about CCTV and trust, we worry about e-commerce and trust. I have read these articles. They were the only people who actually raised the questions of legitimacy and trust. It does not mean that our sociology and social sciences should believe that what we need to do is to create societies based around trust. That is not the imperative. Societies will have more or less trust, and they will have distrust and in many cases we hope that those who should be distrustful. But if we build a conceptual apparatus around the belief that trust is the most important process and it is defining the theme of what is now emerging amongst many of social scientists into interdisciplinary manner than we will be again leading us ourselves into the blind alley that occurred 40 years ago, when sociologists and conservative reaction to the enlightenment brought themselves to believe that the main problem with society was one of order. Just because societies are complex does not mean we will abdicate our concerns around power and, in a sense, give all of our energy to see how we can manipulate little areas of trust.

My final point – Richard Wolin in his 'Seduction of Unreason' made this point in a slightly emotional manner. He is the elephant in the city at the moment and it is his arguments we should have been addressing in our discussion yesterday. When he writes – and this is an example of captive minds in the West over the last 40 years – he says 'The conviction that humanity is incapable of rationally shaping its own destiny, and that, instead, mysterious, irrational forces are the ultimate determinants of human affairs, is a position shared by both reactionaries and post-modernists.'

#### **Les Levidow**

For me it is a rare opportunity to take part in this discussion with speakers from Eastern and Western Europe. I want to ask about the longer-term process of dialogue and interchange. In these discussions do people in Eastern Europe learn about the forms of subtle repression and self-censorship in Western Europe? And conversely, do people from Western Europe learn about the various forms of disobedience and rebellion in Eastern Europe?

#### **Gottfried Wagner**

I want to connect Nina's contribution with George's contribution. When I started to study at the Vienna University in 1968 I was most frightened by my colleagues who were disobedient while at the same time defending Pol Pot to the end. So I wonder whether the disobedience vis-a-vis the structures in Austria, for example, were compatible with major political failures which led finally to the integration of a system

**If we build a conceptual apparatus around the belief that trust is the most important process and it is defining the theme of what is now emerging amongst many of social scientists into interdisciplinary manner than we will be again leading us ourselves into the blind alley that occurred 40 years ago.**

which did not leave any space for civil disobedience. Later, at the university, reforms to some extent were made only to be removed by the same people when they took power 20 years later. But at the same time in Vienna, Krzysztof Michalski set up the Institute for Human Sciences, which introduced the thinkers of Central Europe and the neighbourhood of Austria. In the long-term, it was a major influence on the intellectual climate and political discourse. When I question your positive interpretation of the 1968 movements I am also questioning with greater emphasis Nina's position. I think there is a lot of disappointment – as George put it, as disappointed love – in fact I see it another way around. In what happened in the perception of Central and Eastern European intellectuals in the West or in Middle Europe including Austria and France has been probably of more importance than 1968, Pol Pot, and Vietnam discourses.

#### **Olga Glondys**

I would like that everybody look at me as a representative of beautiful East European intellectuals but I think that the West intellectuals have their own very important problems. There is a great myth shared by the part of Eastern European intellectuals that they made everything beautifully, that they are the best. But some Spanish intellectuals think, for example, that the Spanish Civil War was the first moment of the Europeans to fight Fascism. Each country has its own beautiful ethos. Since 1989 it is just a process to successfully get to know each other and that dialogue should be continued. Another remark that I would like to make is about the second renaissance in Europe – I know Nina's article about renaissance and her polemics with Maria Janion thesis about the final end of Polish Romanticism in 1989. Janion said that our romantic conception of the Polish world had finished in 1989. Nina has her own idea about the renaissance – the beautiful solidarity movement was about renaissance ideas not romantic ones. Don't you think that today the situation in Poland has changed, and we still have Romanticism but the government tries to find artificial new enemies, even it tries to conduct a discourse that pretends divide Poland into two camps?

#### **László Rajk**

A little anecdote from 1985. There was a so-called Alternative Culture Forum, which was an unofficial version of the Helsinki Cultural Forum. Participants ranged from Susan Sontag, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger, Timothy Garton Ash, Alain Finkielkraut and György Bence. It was an absolutely unofficial cultural conference on censorship, especially on self-censorship in Central and Eastern Europe, not Western. But something came out, which is valid for both sides. Without censorship and self-censorship



we would not have such beautiful metaphors and symbolical poems as we do have. In the 70s and 80s it was a nice symbiosis between Eastern and Western European intellectuals. Neither of us could live without the other. Sometimes people from Eastern Europe were overestimated by their Western friends and sometimes they did not have enough of the criticism from the West.

At more length it was very bad that all of us thought that we are stars as Nina mentioned, that we are the gurus of the revolution. It is what I call the bad side of self-censorship in the West and I think it is still valid that those samizdat movements, art movies, poems, romances, short stories are not considered as method of criticism. They are overestimated and still these are very sensitive: it is very hard to say of a poem, movie or to a painting that it is a piece of ... and does not carry any value. This self-censorship is still going on and we should change it profoundly.

#### **Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick**

I live in Norway, which has been described by some ironic commentators as a 'regime of goodness'. This is the wealthiest country in the world, it has the highest contribution per capita. A beautiful mind in a beautiful body. There is a kind of perversion of this regime of goodness which is also the positive side of post-modernity, which has created its own inquisition for those who have their opinions and who are looking for a kind of opposition in the world. What is post-modernity about? Post-modernity is about a regime of doubt which has replaced the regime of truth. You are supposed to be in doubt, divided, fragmented. Fundamentalists were also victims, Hitler was a victim, everybody was a victim in this universe. Of course, I am exaggerating for rhetorical effect – but this is a regime of doubt and those who actually define the regime of doubt are in trouble. There is something like a self-gagging of Norwegian intellectuals, French intellectuals and so on. Intellectuals in the West are thrown into the position of intellectuals in the East and the Soviet empire. They are putting a gag on a mouth for fear of offending this invisible inquisition checking whether you are for gender equality, for/against women's liberation and so on. You have to be on the right side also in the debate to be for/against Palestinians or Israelis.

#### **George Kolankiewicz**

There is an important point that comes out of that – your enemy and my enemy is also our enemy, these holly alliances that were put together at that particular period of time during and after the end of the Vietnam war. It made a very important mark on the collective consciousness of students, student unions and the population. All

**Self-censorship is important but it belongs to a different age. Surveillance is the question now, whether it be in the war or terror or more generally.**

**Post-modernity is about a regime of doubt which has replaced the regime of truth.**

were very late in recognising what the humanism project was about. One had reminded the humanism, one could have reminded disobedient, one could have reminded distrustful. Is there a difference between distrust and doubt? There is an extraordinary sociological process at work there, whereby surveillance at particular places, at particular times, and for particular uses, imposes an identity and imposes norms which are not negotiated. It therefore takes on power which has not been legitimised. And in a sense these are the kinds of questions that social scientists should be looking at. Self-censorship is important but it belongs to a different age. Surveillance is the question now, whether it be in the war or terror or more generally. There is a whole range of things happening under the heading of trust or distrust which we should be looking at. In a sense what happened under post-modernism disappeared, became, as Nina indicated, all over the place. Foucault said that power is everywhere you cannot study it. It is the same with trust. If trust is everywhere what is the point of studying it? These are meta-narratives. I really worry sometimes that we are moving away from what was a sociological movement, what was a radical movement, the movement of the disobedient generation. When they saw the way in which power was used, very often they did not fill in their names because they did not associate with them. They themselves confronted their consciousness, but more importantly they confronted their intellects. I really fear that many of my colleagues went off in all of these directions, because fashion was more important than trying to adhere to what really has been the achievement of social sciences.

To come back to the Western perspective of Eastern Europe, we – in the West – have not been appreciated how much sociology has done, not just in the communist period. I spent a lot of time in Poland when my friends would say: why are you going to this country instead of taking your kids to the Riviera or elsewhere? In a way that David Ost recognises as well, it was an attempt to understand what intellectuals were doing in order to keep a grip on the realities of their society in a sense of real censorship. Some of us appreciated it and that is largely because sociologists and intellectuals in the East have previously been censored and now they are pessimistic. Before I came to this conference I went to listen to self-exiled writer Dubravka Ugrešić from Croatia. I found her feelings so depressive because what many intellectuals do – they take that experience from Eastern Europe and translate it immediately to the West and although it is a fair mechanism it does not give out the best of the creative.

#### **Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick**

My view is that the revolution of 1980-81 has to be re-evaluated in the sense that it

was no longer the type of revolution the Poles have staged before. It was not romantic fever, it was not this uncontrolled spontaneous process based on the kind of idea of ultimate sacrifice. Sacrifice was there, and a romantic component was there, but it was a novel revolution in the sense that it was empowered by the ideas of intellectuals who romanticised antiquity. If you read the writings behind this revolution these were people who were more fascinated by the ideas of antiquity and had studied the totalitarian regime. In other words it was empowered by a thought that was a deep reflection over the nature of totalitarianism both on the right and on the Left. It was a self-restraining revolution, a self-limiting revolution. It was quite unique and hence it is not an accident that it was extremely peaceful, 'A Step-by-Step Revolution' to use Timothy Garton Ash's approach.

It was almost a Scandinavian revolution based on the idea of adaptive reform. It was the first time in Polish history. I have studied the writings behind it trying to connect all these ideas into an integrated vision. I think that it is both a pre-modern and a modern revolution, with the return to religion but in a kind of reflective way. Adam Michnik emphasised 'no, we were not romantics, we were really careful designers, we were planning everything, we were studying, drawing lessons and conclusions from all the defeats and failures'. I think that we have to take it seriously. Now we have a renaissance, we have romanticism or a second renaissance based on this rebirth of human dignity because of what it was – an explosion of human dignity on the European stage. Now we have the *smuta* – a Russian term – we have the kind of vacuum that John was talking about yesterday, fumbling and undermining ourselves, criticising ourselves to death, telling ourselves how horrible we are, how nothing happens, we are totally uninterested, in other words – confirming all Western prejudices and Habermas' idea that actually there was nothing European about the revolution.

#### Zbigniew Czubinski

I would never have expected that I would have the pleasure of having so many Ukrainian and Belarusian students studying at my Faculty. At the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s there were Western countries, and in particular the United Kingdom, that developed great programmes for Polish students and today we are paying back this tribute to Belarusian and Ukrainian students. We have great Belarusian students, we teach them, train them, we educate them about international law and EU law but somehow these Belarussian students tend to disappear. Does it mean that they go back to Belarus? Does it mean that they stimulate activity that

would lead to something? Where do they disappear? What happens to them? What happens to these bright minds that go back to Belarus, are they actually subdued? The second question – the closer Belarusians are to Poland the higher awareness there is, but if Belarusians do not come to Poland than Poles tend to believe that Belarus is a form of status quo that is not to be changed, is this true?

And the third question: which way should Polish politics go as far as Belarus is concerned. Now Poland will become a member of the Schengen Treaty which means that if we are to adhere to the EU law we will be further away from each other and our contacts will be made more difficult to maintain. What do you think about the Polish membership of Schengen?

#### David Ost

This panel has the title 'East-West apartheid' and I do not really see claims being made about that. On the one hand there were comparisons about 1968 and some similar kinds of protests and there is a theme of self-denigration that seems to be across the board. I heard in Professor Szuszkiewicz's account of Belarus maybe not so much self-denigration but just that there is still a very poor, weak situation in that country. Nina was talking about this in the West as well. I wonder is there really East-West apartheid here? What is that supposed to mean? Also this claim that self-denigration in the West is contrary to the humanist idea. You just do not connect this self-denigration with power, as George brings up, because you do not draw the conclusions that Norway, through being involved in everything in the last 10 years, has become a player. For Norway, as having a particular claim to be a major power, a major country, there are different ways of carving out power. The one big event of universal significance in the last quarter of the last century was in 1989, but the way the Polish authorities tried their best to make sure to tell the rest of the world that *Solidarność* has got no universal significance, that it was only a nationalist uprising of catholic Poles. This is the claim of the new regime and no one else has the right to claim on it. In East Europe's self-denigration is also its own kind of claim to power. Part of the Polish government attempts simultaneously to assert itself in the world community but asserts itself always with the narrative of victimisation – we were victimised by the West, the present government has been victimised by the rich, by 'układy' and people in power are supposedly victimised by everybody around them and they have a particular claim to gain power which may even be working in a certain way. I think there are different ways to fulfil the same kind of functions. It is a kind of political conflict. I would be on the side of greater universalism, I can also understand this particularism as its own claim to power in a different context.

**Part of the Polish government attempts simultaneously to assert itself in the world community but asserts itself always with the narrative of victimisation – we were victimised by the West, the present government has been victimised by the rich, by 'układy' and people in power are supposedly victimised by everybody around them.**

### **Stanislaw Shushkevich**

I am grateful that many European countries have developed educational programmes for Belarusian students – they have access to international educational programmes. This means that our students may pursue subjects and issues that they cannot study in Belarus. They are free and young people, they do protest against today's authorities and would not be admitted to Belarusian state universities. When Belarusian students come here they arrive in a totally different world and you cannot compare the two worlds. For instance, at my Faculty of Nuclear Physics we received a Vietnamese; it was a young Ph.D. student who came to my house. He shot down a couple of American airplanes during the war and he was sent as my Ph.D. student. He told me that with his monthly remuneration he could buy 700 grams of meat and that was a huge contrast between Vietnam and Belarus. The same contrast can be seen between the life of Belarussian students in Belarus and the life of Belarussian students abroad. When they come back to Belarus having graduated from foreign universities they cannot find employment; they cannot work at state organisations. Such young people find it extremely difficult to find employment in a private company because private companies may have trouble if they employ graduates of foreign universities.

When the European Communities were created the legislation was set for the benefit and for the needs of the six countries. Today Europe means 27 countries which may provide assistance to other, non-EU countries. Yet, whatever assistance is granted, it is done via government. In case of Belarus it would have to go through the government of Lukashenka.

Poland and Schengen – we were promised in Brussels and Strasbourg that there will be new legislation and it will be drafted by the year 2008 and will come into force by the year 2013. But I am afraid that Belarus will by that time have become Russian again, because Russians are investing a lot in Belarus to make Belarus one of the Russian provinces.

### **Paddy Coulter**

Apartheid is a shocking word, a very strong word. In my mind it goes beyond simply the idea of segregation because it has this South African racial association, which is really quite disturbing. Ironically, the racial connotation of South Africa was the privileging of Europeans against indigenous Africans under the apartheid system.

### **László Rajk**

There is a certain apartheid type of attitude in the West towards the East which is due to Eastern European countries bringing in this dirty, bloody, forgotten thing to the European Union called nationalism. All of a sudden they do not even have an English word for a man from the Czech Republic, he is a 'Chechy', 'Czech', I do not even know what the proper word is, but it is disturbing. The other big is the radical right in Eastern Europe. Marching up and down waving anti-Semitic slogans, East Europe brings into the European Union some forgotten or talked over things and forces. I absolutely agree with you that this is apartheid, due to the newcomers into Eastern Europe. But also partially it is because of self-censorship in the West. And that which Gottfried mentioned and, sorry to say, George's answer was a beautiful example of self-censorship in the West. Instead of saying that supporting Pol Pot or being a Maoist was silly, we started to explain that it was fashion and that we should have taken it more easily. Are these young university students doing fashion now or are they going to be the part of the establishment in five or ten years? We do not care. These guys at the university in their 20s, they are doing just the same thing we did in our youth. Is it such a crime to have a different political attitude?

### **George Kolankiewicz**

The question of apartheid is not just East-West and us as academics. I am talking as an academic and I have never been a member of the political government. The only time I have ever advised a politician was 1980 when I was debriefing the Labour Party after returning from Poland's signing of the Gdańsk agreement. A very well known politician, now a member of the Labour Party within the close circle said to me 'to what extent is Solidarity, with what had just happened and was signed, part of a Vatican plot to simply bring down socialism?' Now, that was not a silly question because the perception in the West at the time was this 'was it an assault against the only existing versions of socialism.' What follows from this is that if there is an apartheid then meetings such as this are probably the beginnings of a kind of Truth Commission. Perhaps it is about time that we started telling each other the truth and Laszlo has made that point. In many cases Western academics who have picked and chosen what was of interest for them made careers out of that, but more important is this question that Laszlo raises. I could not explain what was happening amongst student opinions in 1968 and of so many movements – Socialist Labour League, International Socialists, the IMG. You actually have to have a degree in political theory to be able to actually understand what each of the leading proponents says in order to understand the differences. In a sense it was a kind of ideologi-

cal masturbation at the time. I used that word quite consciously to the extent that it may have had consequences for the people engaged in it. I do not think it had any real impact upon politics outside of universities. Let me give you an example. Recently a young man funded by the British Council came over and his job was to shadow members of the chief management of my university which is one of the leading universities in the UK. He sat on a whole range of very powerful committees and one of the points he made in his report was that you allowed everybody to speak, you allowed a huge amount of exchange, even abuse, but at the end of the day you achieved what you wanted to achieve without going to a vote. Is there a difference? In the country and university he came from the dean would never hold a meeting until he or she was certain that they had votes in hand in order to achieve their outcome. This is the difference in culture, which I put down specifically to the outcomes of the possibilities of dialogue and voice etc. which, in the end, you hope will lead to consensus on the interests of the institution.

There were other cases: in 1968 the major pieces of research were not about students, they were not about Pol Pot, were not about what was happening in Vietnam. The biggest question facing them was to what extent was the Western working class revolutionary and to what extent was the real threat to capitalist power emerging out of Paris and possibly out of Germany and possibly, but hardly likely, in the UK. It was a real issue and a possibility of what might have emerged out of those explosions.

These are the questions that those of us who are serious about what the future of Europe might be and those who were isolated in Eastern Europe because that did not provide the model. It acted as an antidote to anything, to an alternative vision which was socialism, you had to argue against that. One of the reasons that I spent so much time in Poland as a young person was trying to understand what made this system work. Then you had the real import of East European intellectuals. These were people like Conrad, Michnik and others, who really tried to understand the nature of power within the redistributive party state that was important as to what was happening: whether you were for or not the particular faction which was associated with a bloody war in Vietnam. It was important for us in terms of indicators of conscience but not in terms of indicators of our immediate interests. We were mainly concerned about the historical contingency or otherwise of working class revolutionary consciousness; the impact on the bourgeoisie; why the most confident parts of the working class were anti-revolutionary; the least confident parts of the wor-

king class were revolutionary; without ideas. Those were the questions in the UK in 1968 which were driving people's intellectual ambitions and that determines why I used that word silly.

#### **Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick**

There was the Yalta agreement that led to extensive apartheid in Europe. It was divided in a very serious way, we have forgotten probably about it and traces of this apartheid are still with us today. We would be naive to believe that it has disappeared – it was political apartheid, cultural apartheid, racial apartheid, it was an inferior invisible Europe, the guys died in the barracks. The second thing is the post-colonial condition in the West and East. One of the interesting 'day-after' effects of colonial oppression is the kind of complex that Mannoni refers to, namely the kind of sense within the population that you are a victim, a sense of self-victimisation and passivity, what we can call the triumphalism of pain. This triumphalism of pain is actually what we are getting when the Kaczyńskis are there on stage shouting away and screaming. There is this conception of freedom that is less something dwelling inside you but always coming from the outside. Waiting for the outside to solve all your problems is something that fits with Irish society. I think that studies of homo sovieticus, which are a kind of an insight into the nature of this condition, have to be brought together with studies of the postcolonial condition in other countries in order to understand the whole gestalt.



**Zdzisław Mach, Unni Wikan, Gottfried Wagner, Michal Vaščka**



**Les Levidow, Alicja Dudziak**



**Henryk Woźniakowski, Janusz Majcherek**



**Paweł Świdorski, Fredrik Barth**



VD  
VILLA  
DECIUS

DEBATE III

# Multiculturalism: A Failed Project?

European legacy of colonial heritage  
Rethinking the clash of civilisations  
The fetish of dialogue in modern discourse  
Living in a poli-ethnic public sphere

**Michal Vašečka, moderator**

I remember a beautiful evening in 1994 in Przegorzaty Castle, where Czesław Miłosz was reading his poetry. I was fascinated with his description of young people from Vilnius arriving in Paris in the 1920s and 1930s. Only there were they becoming real Europeans. These people were fascinated with the multicultural spirit of Paris, although they were coming from a part of Europe that used to have a more colourful tradition of multiculturalism than the capital of France. Now we know that the multicultural spirit has been disappearing from Eastern Europe, and later we went through the clinical death of multiculturalism. It happened not only in Vilnius and Yassy but also in Chernivtsi, Lviv and Bratislava, a city that used to be German-Jewish-Hungarian-Slovakian, but now it is mainly a Slovakian city with some remnants of Hungarians, who are practically invisible.

After 1989 both intellectuals and the so-called common people in Eastern European countries started to rediscover the genius loci of cities which previously were homogenised and, thus, became grey and flat. Sometimes one might look with suspicion

at the citizens of Krakow or Prague rebuilding the social life of their Jewish quarters rebuilding Jewish quarters without Jews (Professor Gruber refers to this in his beautiful book 'Virtual Jewish: Reinventing Jewish Culture in Europe'). We might be suspicious about how Slovaks are building this creole, kitsch style of Bratislava, which is becoming more Austrian than Austria itself. What is important is the resurrection of a certain type of qualitative memory, no matter if we understand the whole process as the rebuilding of the multicultural spirit, or just as a social construction based on certain beliefs. The problems, doubts and good arguments for the enemies of multicultural society came from a quarter that nobody from Central and Eastern Europe was expecting. The recent message from a country that used to be an icon of modern multiculturalism – the Netherlands – says: multiculturalism is dead. Multiculturalism is criticised not only by conservative and clerical forces, but also by liberal ones, which is quite a new phenomenon. Western European countries integration policies are one-dimensional and based on economic continuation, and somehow omit other parts of the integration process.

**The recent message from a country that used to be an icon of modern multiculturalism – the Netherlands – says: multiculturalism is dead.**

There are many explanations as to why the concept of multiculturalism has been undergoing problems. Many sociologists who are structural functionalists are saying that the concept of multiculturalism is primordial and based on ethnicity. The concept of ethnicity has been approached in the same wrong way as the concept of race in the 19th century. In other words, ethnicity has been used by multiculturalism as a quasi-scientific category.

Secondly, we might pose the question as to whether multiculturalism secures civic integration. It might do so, but only in countries that are based on non-ethnicised citizenship, on politically defined nations. It is not the case in most EU countries, not to mention Central European countries, which are very much ethnically based.

Without redefinition of ethnically based identities, neither multiculturalism nor a real accommodation of those who are not part of the core of society will be possible. Thirdly, national identities are changing very dramatically these days. Stuart described three scenarios of what will happen to ethnicised national identities. The first one was the erosion of national identities as the result of cultural homogenisation and global postmodernism. The second: the strengthening of national identity as the result of globalisation. The third is a decrease in the importance of national identities that will go hand in hand with the emergence of new, hybridised identities. And this is what occurs these days. The problem is that multiculturalism

is; in spite of identity changes, fostering concepts that are deeply rooted in the ethnic and primordial concepts of modernity.

Fourthly, post-modern countries in general posit their ability to be inclusive and to secure the social cohesion with other countries. Minority rights, which are very often group rights, are suddenly problematic. Structural problems of modern societies deal also with the controversy between liberal democracy and reality. Currently, liberal democratic states have a paradoxical nature: they begin with liberal universalism and end up with ethnic particularism. Liberal democracies have, since the 18th-19th century, seemed to be democratised, and at the same time, nationalised. Where is the captive mind here? For me, Europeans in their self-perception are locked in their ethnically defined cages and their minds are in a way captive to their ethnicity.

Although my view is influenced by my Central-European origin, I strongly believe that European societies should try to redefine their ethnic identities. Otherwise, we will be able to speak only about tolerance, and not about multiculturalism. We need to secure a shift from a cultural definition of our nation to a voluntary one.

#### **Unni Wikan**

Yesterday, in his keynote speech, Professor John Ralston Saul said that multiculturalism was a word he hardly ever used, a word that essentially sprang out of 18th-19th century custom and focused on corporate groups. He also said he regarded it as a catastrophic approach. I have done research on plural societies for many years and my experience is in line with what Professor Saul said.

Multiculturalism is a word that has been used with a range of meanings in social science, among intellectuals and in the media. But as I use it, and Professor Saul used it yesterday, it is to do with the granting of rights to specific groups: religious or ethnic, in order to ensure the survival of that group. It is assumed that it is not enough to grant rights to individuals in order to ensure the survival of ethnic or religious groups. The groups themselves must be granted rights. As several thinkers have pointed it out; among them Amartya Sen, who in his book 'Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny' The recent message from a country that used to be an icon of modern multiculturalism – the Netherlands – says: multiculturalism is dead. says 'Multiculturalism is an ideology which promotes conservative elements within a group. You will realize in almost all multicultural societies like India, Australia,



South Africa, and Sweden that groups' demand for specific rights usually focused on family rights. These rights limit human rights, particularly those of women and children.' There was a famous book that appeared in 2000 called 'Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?' It was published in the United States, and had several authors, among others Susan Moller Okin, and contributions from several social scientists and humanists. Their conclusion was the same: multiculturalism is bad for women. All my researches in Scandinavia and in the Middle East are in accordance with that conclusion.

In Scandinavia Sweden is the only country to have pursued multicultural ideology and politics. In Sweden, from the late 1960s to 2004, the law permitted child marriage only in the case of girls of immigrant background. The law applied even if the girl was Swedish-born, even if she had Swedish citizenship. It applied if she was the child or grandchild of an immigrant that came from a country that permitted child marriage. I think Sweden today looks back with shame on this policy (it was abolished in April 2004). This happened after a number of high-profile honour killings: girls being murdered by their own fathers or brothers for standing up and refusing forced marriages. In Norway and Denmark we have not had that kind of multiculturalism, but as Professor Witoszek-Fitzpatrick has already pointed out, we still are dedicated to respecting other cultures, since multiculturalism is also about that. But in Norway we have not gone to the extent Sweden has in emphasizing group identity, although multiculturalism slips in under the carpet.

Recently a Somali leader of a youth club in Oslo said that he felt that Norway was undermining solidarity between Somalis. According to him, Norway was underscoring clan rivalries by funding youth clubs on the basis of clan affiliation. In Oslo, there are probably 10,000 Somalis. Do you know how many different Somali youth clubs are being run by Somalis? More than 80. They are established on the basis of clan or ethnic and tribal rivalries.

According to my research multiculturalism is an anti-humanist project. It abdicates any concern with power, because it neglects to look into how power is being misused within groups that are funded and supported. I am a specialist in the Middle East and Islam. The problem, in Sweden for example, is that when somebody comes to a local government representative and tells him something that should be respected on the basis of Islam, the representative will agree that it indeed should be respected, because he doesn't even know what Islam is about. Within these groups, multicultu-

**Multiculturalism is bad for women.**

ralism facilitates the misuse of power. Within many ethnic groups that are part of the multicultural project in Europe today, there is strong censorship and surveillance, and there is an absolute requirement of loyalty. You are a traitor if you speak against the group. It is policy and ideology that requires absolute loyalty, and it created boundaries between people."

Yesterday an example was given of a Turkish girl who had never been invited to visit her Polish friends. My experience is that such girls are very often invited to Norwegian, Swedish or Danish homes. The point is that their parents will not allow them to go out when they reach the age of nine years old. They are afraid of the kind of bad influences that these girls will come under. We have to realize that the focus on group identity and group culture is the thing that makes it very difficult for young girls of that background to have friends among other ethnic groups. In Europe today there is a re-tribalisation, a reinforcement of clans, and re-emergence of an honour code going on. It is very violent and unscrupulous. In Europe, families that belong to groups are under surveillance from their families or clan authorities back in Pakistan, Turkey or Morocco. So it is not a matter of families here being able to decide for their children. As a matter of fact, they are on the lowest level of the hierarchy.

I have been struck by the fact that many of you, from Eastern Europe, have been using your personal experience to talk about censorship, surveillance and the lack of freedom of expression. I will do a similar thing. Due to my education and experience in Muslim issues, for the last 12 years I have felt an obligation to speak about the minority situation in Norway and Sweden. I know my opinions were respected and, due to my knowledge of Arabic, even by Muslims themselves.

**Culture has its right to be respected only to the extent it respects people.**

One of the most important things I always repeat is: culture has its right to be respected only to the extent it respects people. I encountered a lot of harassment because of this statement. Not from Muslims but from liberal intellectuals. It was so bad that at university I had to warn students before using me as a supervisor, because it could be held against them at the time of their exams and when applying for jobs. Finally, in autumn 2003, in the only Scandinavian journal on immigration and integration published in English I was branded not just a racist, I was called a Nazi. It was written that I was similar to those scientists whom had furnished Hitler with justification for the Holocaust. I did not want to read that. Later on, the media picked it up and an attempt was made to get the members of the board of that journal and some leading intellectuals to distance themselves from it. Some of these

intellectuals, who are reachable by e-mail and mobile phone, could not be reached for 14 days. They had disappeared. Eventually, two members of the board, whom I did not know personally, left the board and said in the media that what happened was the worst case of personal persecution they had ever seen as social scientists. The media wrote about this. A year later I was awarded the Freedom of Expression Award in Norway, because I had dared to speak out about the conflict of values in modern, plural societies. You know what happened after that? Suddenly I was everybody's friend and there was no critique. I was a kind of star, a hero, and my department was so proud of me. Of course I am happy to be free of that persecution, but I realized that the intellectual community would not stand up for me until others beyond had stood out and said that there must be limits. There are captive minds in the West too, and there is also censorship. As Professor Saul said, we need to be able to speak about the tension of values, we need to see that here are potentials for real integration, real unity, real commonality, and not just drowning ourselves in using a fetish dialogue.

#### **Michal Vašečka**

Will Kymlicka, who is always asked about the relations between multiculturalism and women's rights, sees it as a problem of liberal democracies in Europe; not being able to stick to the real principles of multiculturalism. Everything that is in dispute with liberal democratic practices cannot be tolerated. So maybe the situation presented by Professor Wikan proves the weakness of the Norwegian government, not the weakness of multiculturalism as it is?

#### **Fredrik Barth**

We have to be precise what we mean by multiculturalism. Maybe the best image for it was the one that was used on the first day of the conference – a sort of social multiple personalities' issue. How people live together in one society but with different identities, different commitments? How can they come together in unity? Their problems can be analogous to those of people with multiple personalities, who have to sustain several identities at the same time and yet are confused by them.

I will be an anthropologist for you and go into particular cases and a particular ethnography. Professor Wikan and I did fieldwork in Saudi Arabia in a town called Sohar where lived a society of many ethnic groups. It was clearly a multicultural society and in some way pluralism of cultures was present there. I had been working with the problem of ethnic groups, and the core question was how they are constitu-

**There are captive minds in the West too, and there is also censorship.**

ted. My main point was to say that when we speak about ethnic groups we think we speak about cultural categories, but in fact we are speaking of social organisations. Ethnicity is belonging to a group, to persons ordered in groups. It is not about differences of cultures. Differences of cultures are quite incidental to the categorisation of people into categories and groups.

In the town of Sohar we found a multi-ethnic community. There were Arabs, Persians, Iranians, Baluchis – a small group that did not seem to have cognate groups, but an ethnic group of its own, and they lived together in a community. So here was an opportunity to look closely at a multi-ethnic social unit: how it was composed and how it functioned. Since my research was to make an analysis of cultural pluralism in a population, I had to look closely at their relationships, at the distribution of cultural variants and at their interaction. The more I looked at it, the more I discovered that when discussing ethnic groups in the town of Sohar I was not discussing most of the cultural differences. So I took my anthropological brief seriously and asked what else I could find there. Groups or aggregates of people are distinguished by cultural characteristics and carry a separate cultural sub-tradition. What was there other than ethnic groups? There were religious congregations. Most of the people in Sohar were Muslims, but they were also Sunnis, Shias, Ibadis, and Hindu. So we had there four religious communities and they criss-crossed ethnic identities. One could not characterise Arabs in terms of which congregation they belong to. In fact, they were divided between all three mentioned above. Also the Persian ethnic cohort was divided between Sunnis and Shias. Almost all of them were criss-crossed in this manner. Clearly, the cultural plurality of this place was not organised in terms of ethnicity, but along several axes.

The most striking differences between people in Sohar were differences in terms of being either Bedouin or town people. The latter were very adamant, and it was a very important thing, that they were distinguished from the wild, primitive Bedouin. There were judgments of morality, of the adequacy of life and the advantages and disadvantages of these two populations.

Who were the Bedouins? They were all Arabs, either Ibadi or Sunni. There were also some groups of Bedouins who regarded themselves as originally Baluchis. These lifestyle differences could only be described in terms of culture and they criss-crossed the other flows of culture. There were also differences of occupation and experiential differences in this town, and the skills people needed for their varied occupations

were also very diverse. These are also cultural features. A cultural difference between a man making his living as a merchant and the one making his living as a cultivator of date palms is huge since they are doing very different things and they have different experiences and so they become very different social persons. They are also distributed in a criss-cross manner. When I looked at that population, some of them were biologically African, and this leads to the part Omanis have played in the slave trade. Here are other differences: people being privileged or underprivileged in terms of blood and descent: some were ex-slaves and others were free. There were also differences among free people in terms of descent, on the basis of the tribal system. So, there was a multiplicity of tribes. These have cultural differences, too. Each category carries cultural characteristics: for example, ex-slaves were striking in their physical motor habits which could be seen in the way they walked: Africans walk in a jive-dance kind of way, their limbs are much looser when they walk in Africa. I saw them in this town among the ex-slaves. They were quite different from other populations and their cultural features were distributed in a way at odds with other kinds of cultural differences.

Finally I discovered that their world is divided between men and women and we have different cultures everywhere. In Sohar a striking cultural difference was that women were masked and lived very segregated lives. They had social patterns and ideals, skills and practices that were specific for them. Men had other cultural differences. We also discovered a third gender – a transvestite's category of men who were called xaniths. They had a culture of their own. One of the feminine practices done by men was cooking: great skills women did not have at all. So I was mapping out the actual cultural distribution of plurality in this very small community of 20,000 people. The social organisation of each of these sets of contracts was contrasting and criss-crossed.

multicultural community. How did they live? They all together and we marvelled that. We were charmed to converse with them. The men were very explicit about it. Their jewellery, the beauty of a man is in his gracious and seemed to offer respect to each other. Of many things: about things people elsewhere kill for, like ghias and Ibadis, or the differences between nomads and sedentary? What are the practical requirements of a multiculturalism sufficient? We did not see a multiculturalism. What we found was a strong

**What are the practical requirements of cultural pluralism?**

I was so ethnographic in Sohar with the society and its experiential occupations with the problem.

emphasis, among men particularly, on a code of honour, where your honour depends on your graciousness. You may look down on all these others, you may have your opinions about them, but you treat them politely and seek their company. But for us, they said, to criticize these people would be very crude and inelegant. So, each person is trying to maximise his own, and among women, in much smaller circles, their own ideology of being elegant, being what we would loosely call tolerant, or more than tolerant – being gracious. How can they sustain that? What if they disagree on things? Well, here is the rub. To look at the practice of multiculturalism we have to see how the problems of daily life are solved. In fact in Oman, and in Sohar specifically, I found that gracefulness of interaction was something that prevented them from exercising sanctions on each other. In fact it seemed to be a society without control, because the moment you started controls you were becoming inelegant and you were the loser. How could they solve problems then? They went to the governor of the town. The absolute king appointed an absolute governor in all the major towns and the governor held a court where people came and had their problems resolved in a completely authoritarian manner. Once you went to the governor, there was no appeal. He would listen, and you had to present your case politely, and then he would make a decision. Sometimes the governor had some experts of the shariat as his assistants, but most often he would decide using his own political or moral opinions. What sounded fair to him and was in line with state policy would be the verdict.

People in Sohar were buying this cultural pluralism by giving up their political rights. They were totally administered from the outside, by the governor. If in that cultural setting they had pursued their interests in other ways: by mobilizing people, by making pressure groups, I speculated that everything would go wrong, everything would blow up. The reason for that was that there would be a cultural disagreement that would necessarily explode if it were resolved through the pursuit of mobilizing public support.

My tentative conclusion is that the policy and ideology of multiculturalism produces a distribution of cultural features and differences that appears to form a very tolerant and in some ways very relaxed kind of community, but it would not be able to survive if the political process was democratic, since the essence of democracy is that you mobilise discussions over issues. If they did that it would reveal all these deep differences of culture and there would be no way of resolving them.

I take the history I recounted as a kind of parable of the problem of multiculturalism. How can a multicultural community handle the praxis of social life? What does it

take? It is not enough to have an ideology or the code of politeness of the Sohari people. You have to have political institutions that can handle it. I see a deep contradiction between the way the democratic process works and the way multicultural societies need to operate to be able to survive.

#### Gottfried Wagner

I would like to start with a test question to you: who is from an extra-European background, except from the USA and Australia? Two persons. From where? Canada. It shows we are probably quite right in our monoculture, despite the previous discussion in which you tried to follow the traces of an apartheid between the East and the West of Europe. We are a very monocultural society. Yesterday we had a discussion on the Left and Right as classes – I think we all belong to the same, quite well-off class of decision makers, thinkers and people who can influence public opinion. On our panel we were talking about multiculturalism and people from Oman but there is nobody speaking from their perspective. This is the usual way we negotiate differences in our conferences and seminars.

I lead an organisation that deals with diversity and multiculturalism from its inception. Having intervened East and West and their culture for over a decade, we have a huge experience in dealing with diversity in Europe. But we have totally overlooked the fact that in the midst of our hometown Amsterdam, or Rotterdam, or Western Europe, society has changed dramatically. London, for example, by 2010 will have 40% of its inhabitants from an extra-European background.

I would like to use this opportunity to talk about organisational change addressing the issue of diversity from one particular angle. More specifically, I would like to talk about culture. Why do arts and culture play a specific role in society? One of the reasons is that all discourses are, at the moment, 'cultural'. The concept of culture or a class phenomenon is very often put in a context where the idea of multiculturalism has always been proclaimed as one of the main reasons for the success of societies. It has become a kind of secret mantra in European society. In Europe, we have a new set of diversities that are not only different but also more complex. The question is: what do we do with the value of diversity? The third reason is based on the fact that artists and cultural operators even produce in a very remote village, but in a context where they are not only producing and boundaries and are by nature very international. They are acting as trend-cultural messengers without losing the

**I see a deep contradiction between the way the democratic process works and the way multicultural societies need to operate to be able to survive.**

**Probably the most dangerous are us – the liberal democrats, who are so fed up with populists that we start eroding democracy to get rid of them.**

roots in the place they produce their works of art. The fourth argument is that, art, as we all know, is most complex: it has the capacity of moving us in a quite concise and almost unexplainable way. It plays on several registers of meaning, but it reaches our senses. We all know examples when pieces of art can have a deep impact that lasts much longer and reaches out much deeper than any political and intellectual discourse. We also have many examples in our societies where artistic productions have such a lasting impact.

Yesterday we discussed the issues of populism. There is a massive connection between our topic today and populism. Recently Ivan Krastev wrote an important piece on populism where he said that the main drive behind populist politicians is basically to exchange the elites, and for that reason they 'instrumentalise' whatever is opportune; and multiculturalism is most opportune because it plays on fears and insecurities. But it is not only about populists. Probably the most dangerous are us – the liberal democrats, who are so fed up with populists that we start eroding democracy to get rid of them. What we are facing here is the problem of democratic leadership. Here again artists and cultural operators are coming into the picture, because some of them develop a non-democratic authority which can speak on a different level. One of the best examples was last year's decision of the Swedish Nobel Prize Committee to award Orhan Pamuk the Nobel Prize. The piece that he wrote is one of the most beautiful examples of negotiating differences between the East and West. It was a signal of the utmost importance and utmost artistic excellence.

Another argument I would like to consider is that artistic work often transcends the maker; artists are sometimes stupid, ideologised or they take wrong or dangerous positions. But in most cases their works develop a complexity and differentiation that helps us to bundle complexity in a way that influences public feelings. The most dangerous simplifications might be cultural: identity and hybridity discourses. There is a prevailing pattern among intellectuals to talk about hybridity of identity. I think the danger of this exaggerated ideology is that you tend to overlook long streams of traditions and cultural values that have been building up over centuries within a country. That needs to be respected.

Art plays with identifications and dissolving identifications, it plays with hybridity and at the same time it adds to this stream of cultural values. Therefore, I think it is very important to reach social, political discourse issues through the promotion of artistic production and dissemination. This has to do with participation. As in this

I would like to use this opportunity to talk about organisational change addressing the issue of diversity from one particular angle. More specifically, I would like to talk about culture. Why do arts and culture play a specific role in society? One of the reasons is that all discourses are, at the moment, 'cultural'. The concept of culture or a class phenomenon is very often put in a context where the idea of multiculturalism has always been proclaimed as one of the main reasons for the success of societies. It has become a kind of secret mantra in European society. In Europe, we have a new set of diversities that are not only different but also more complex. The question is: what do we do with the value of diversity? The third reason is based on the fact that artists and cultural operators even produce in a very remote village, but in a context where they are not only producing and boundaries and are by nature very international. They are acting as trend-cultural messengers without losing the

room, where there are no representatives of minorities, most cultural organisations tend to self-immunise themselves. There are hardly any cultural institutions which deal with migration or with a new creativity related to the conflicts it causes. This is why we decided in our foundation to take this deficit seriously and try to change the organisation. We appointed a Board member who is of non-European background: she comes from the United Kingdom and is the director of the most advanced institute for visual, black migration arts. A second example: we went with our Board and Advisory Council to Istanbul to meet Turkish cultural operators. You cannot imagine what impact it had on our Board members not only to talk on Turkey but also actually talk with Turkish cultural operators and artists. The third thing is that we started using our grants differently: we try to allocate a certain percentage of our grants to projects which positively impact minorities. Not everything we do makes the situation better. Nevertheless, we are not naive, and we are trying to include young generations and their artistic expressions. We use our prestige to lobby and advocate on a European level for better diversity policies and for that purpose we are trying to unite the sector.

These are just a few examples, but what counts for me is that we have been very successful in addressing traditional, almost conventional cultural European diversity. We have to find how to learn from scientists' findings and how to translate these findings into practice. It is not about ideologies, it is about becoming aware of what we exclude in our traditional way of working, including this conference.

#### **Zdzisław Mach**

When I was thinking what to talk about I was trying to organise my small contribution around the central themes given in the programme. The first, which I found quite appropriate, was the legacy of colonialism. I asked myself the question: to what extent the enlargement of Europe and the gradual integration of Central-European countries will change the perspective, the situation which pre-enlargement European countries generally share a feeling of guilt towards the former colonies. It is largely determined by public opinion on what kind of relations Europe should build with people with a non-European heritage.

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe is in many ways different, and I think Poland is a very good example of how different it is. Poland has a particular interpretation of its national history in which Poles are presented as having always been attacked by others; sometimes winning, sometimes losing, but always being attac-

**It makes it difficult for Poles both to think in terms of what we can do together with others, since others are seen as a potential danger, and to manage with the thought that we have done something bad to others.**

**European integration and the integration of Central European countries into the European Union requires that our part of Europe joins in the process of negotiating the identity of Europe.**

ked, always under threat. Of course, there are many historical reasons for that, but that is how the Polish historical and the Polish collective, national identity is constructed. It makes it difficult for Poles both to think in terms of what we can do together with others, since others are seen as a potential danger, and to manage with the thought that we have done something bad to others. We are victims, we have been attacked. It is absolutely essential to the very traditional, ethnic conservative type of collective, national identity in Poland, where Poland is presented as a Messiah, as the Jesus Christ of nations. Of course, Jesus cannot be guilty of anything. If you blame any guilt on Jesus Christ the whole construction collapses. It is perhaps why Poles are difficult and allergic to any suggestion that we might have possibly committed something in the past that brings certain guilt upon us. History is told selectively, and events that might throw a different light on the past are either eliminated or presented without context so that this picture is not disturbed. At the same time it is not how others see Poland: certainly not in Ukraine or Lithuania. The more dialogue there is, the more boundaries are crossed; the more negotiation there is, the more aware we are becoming that our identity as it is constructed from our heritage is at least a matter of debate and before we realise this and enter into a dialogue, before we start negotiating, relations will be bad.

It has already been mentioned that Eastern and Central Europe has a tradition of multiculturalism. The thing is what we do with it. To what extent it has been forgotten and to what extent it is remembered; and how it is remembered. Memories are always selective. One aspect of this multiculturalism is particularly disturbing. It is Jewish heritage, of course. It is the subject of very heavy manipulation and elimination and cleansing. Many of these forgotten memories have been brought back – and Krakow is a perfect place to observe this process of forgetting/remembering and bringing back to memory. 'The Jewish area' is to witness it too. The sociology of forgetting is fascinating: who forgets what and how is this process working?

European integration and the integration of Central European countries into the European Union requires that our part of Europe joins in the process of negotiating the identity of Europe and, therefore, we have to share at least some of the wider European concerns. Dialogue and debate on our misdeeds are needed, a debate which is practically absent in this part of Europe. It is missing because we tend to be very much concentrated on our own problems, but it is also missing because why should we share the concerns of Europe?

This requires a very deep restructuring and rethinking of our identity, including the very core of it. In Poland there is a tendency to reinforce a traditional, national identity, and a presupposition that at the top of the Polish educational system should be national emblems that we all have in common and lower below – diversity. Such an approach would not make European integration any easier. Also, building an identity based on ethnicity and an ethnically interpreted history, together with the image of this country being constantly under threat does not make European integration any easier, because it is difficult to think about it in terms of building important projects together with others. The first tendency is always to think how we are going to defend ourselves against the threat this dialogue will certainly bring upon us.

On the other hand, even today, after ethnic cleansing and the brutal elimination of ethnic minorities from this part of Europe, there are still questions on how to deal with issues of multiculturalism. I am glad that the first speaker told us about collective and individual identities because it is a crucial issue we have to consider when talking about future multiculturalism. I believe the problem with multiculturalism is the question of individual versus collective rights, individual versus collective identity, individual versus collective participation. In a very small way, but very significantly, here in Poland we also have an example of such a problem when it was discussed whether the Romani people should be allowed to get married at the traditional age, which is 12 years old. Of course, it is against the law, but on the other hand there is a discussion as to whether the law should be relative to culture. Collective rights given to ethnic minorities may be very convenient for the male population but not so much so for the female population; more convenient for grown-ups than for children.

I think it is a very general problem in Europe that the conflict between collective and individual rights is at the core of the problems with multiculturalism. This tendency to create ghettos, to create a plurality of isolated enclaves where there is much less integration in terms of political, economic and civil participation. In moments of optimism, when I think about what I would like to see in terms of a multicultural Europe, I would definitely not see it as a plurality of ghettos. Apart from anything else, there would not be a multicultural society, because as a sociologist I can say that the essence of societies is communication and a certain negotiated framework of norms and values. I am completely aware of how difficult it is to negotiate this and to what extent power intertwines in that. On the other hand, when there is no communication and no dialogue, and if there is isolation, we may have a multicultural population but we do not have a multicultural society. It is a great difference. Whatever solutions we choose,

**Collective rights given to ethnic minorities may be very convenient for the male population but not so much so for the female population; more convenient for grown-ups than for children.**

**The real conflict is not between religions, but between collectivistic, religion dominated, closed societies on the one hand and liberal, individualistic, open ones.**

they must involve civic participation, civic citizenship and dialogue based on an equal basis. This sort of dialogue is difficult, no matter whether you are talking about politics or art. Even if we are full of good intentions and want to be open towards others, we still have the categories and prejudices of our cultural background. Very often dialogue consists of an exchange between us and a certain construction of others: we have to build then enter into a dialogue with Orientalism. People who live in the Orient do not think of themselves as oriental. We have built this category. One can also say that within Europe such categories exist, for example, Eastern Europe.

The last remark is about the clash of civilisations. The real conflict is not between religions, but between collectivistic, religion dominated, closed societies on the one hand and liberal, individualistic, open ones. You do not have to go outside Europe to see the confrontation between these two views. There was an interesting comment in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, a Polish daily, after the visit paid by the current Pope Benedict XVI to Turkey. Turkey always comes to mind when we talk about Islam and Europe. The comment was about something unexpected to many, that the Pope did not really build the boundary between Christianity and Islam, but was very positive and open towards religious communities. The message could be that perhaps the real boundary is between the religious people of Europe and secular Europe. Therefore, the religious people of Turkey and the religious people of Europe are on the one side while the secular in Turkey and Europe are on the other side.

**Jan Sowa**

I completely agree with the critique of multiculturalism expressed by our speakers. I also agree with what Professor Unni Wikan said about the most conservative elements within cultural groups. However, I am not sure if the dichotomy of individual and collective rights is a correct one, because for us as social scientists, culture is a collective phenomenon. If we look from the perspective of the individuals actually living the culture, it is a very individual right. I want to speak my language not because it is a language of my community, but mainly because this language expresses me. The rights of the individuals of different cultures are individual rights. I think it is a sort of contradiction within the liberal and multicultural conflict. My question to Professor Unni Wikan and Professor Fredrik Barth is this: You have presented a critique of multiculturalism. The problem is that historically multiculturalism was developed in Canada in order to contradict all the flaws of the melting pot. I think going back to this common frame of liberal rights sounds like a reinventing of the melting pot. What kind of positive alternative within democratic society do you see?

**Paul Gillespie**

I have a question that derives strictly from the previous question. It is a question of terminology: whether the term multiculturalism might be replaced by the term pluricultural. It seems to me that pluralism is a better set of values than multiculturalism. Is multiculturalism not in fact a plural monoculturalism? That is what we want to avoid. Pluralism, on the other hand, would allow for the interpenetration of cultures because at the core of pluralism we have heterogeneity and thus pluralism seems to be a better terminology to be used in a public context.

**Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs**

What do you think about the concept of interculturalism in terms of not only ideology but also policy, as it seems that many intergovernmental organisations, currently and in the future, are heading towards this direction. The Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Commission are launching the year 2008 as the Year of Intercultural Dialogue. What is your opinion on it? Is it the future we should aim for?

**Unni Wikan**

I absolutely agree that pluralism is a better concept than multiculturalism. I think multiculturalism has come to a dead end, and it is a very difficult concept to use now. Pluralism is what we should aim for. We are all for cultural diversity and pluralism, we are all for human rights but what we are against is one that forces a monocultural group identity on people and fixes them in an identity which may not be of their own choice. What I see as the alternative in practical reality today to multiculturalism is fostering and building bridges among people by emphasising what people do have in common: a cross-culture of people and civilisations. As an anthropologist I am struck by the fact that people everywhere cherish freedom and personal liberty. Nobody likes to be oppressed. From my experience I can see a broad consensus across peoples and cultures on some fundamental values that people want to apply to themselves. I believe that in order to make the situation better we should support cooperation between different ethnic groups instead of, for example, financing Muslim communities working only for themselves and within their group. Now, with the best of intentions, we are doing things wrong. In order to create participation among people, to make immigrants feel they have a stake in society, we need to grant them the rights to learn languages and to focus on granting participation possibilities to women. Also, people must be allowed the right to exit the group if that is their personal choice.

**Multiculturalism has come to a dead end, and it is a very difficult concept to use now. Pluralism is what we should aim for.**

**Fredrik Barth**

The idea of the entitlement to exit a group is the most fundamental human right. Tying people to commitments that they cannot repudiate is true violence. In this ethnic multicultural situation the trouble is that often people can only escape by repudiating social relations they in fact value very highly. It is a tragedy, for example, for young Muslim girls who have to get away from an oppressive situation like an arranged marriage. However, after a while they long for their family because they love them. These are irresolvable situations in the categorical sense, but the final back-up solution must always be that everyone should have the right to exit. This is more difficult with children. How old should they be before they get this right? The other thing I would like to emphasize is the idea that culture is one and it is shared in whatever group it is identified with. There are disagreements among the most intimate members of a cultural group and they are constantly engaged in resolving them. Sometimes they cannot resolve them. These social processes sometimes end up in deep conflicts.

For multiculturalism to be practicable, for any kind of culturalism to be practicable, there must be ways of resolving such conflicts. We must not confound that with disagreements that reflect established cultural boundaries. Those conflicts are very much like the ones we have between members of a family who have different opinions and preferences. They are developing them as a development of themselves. Cultural difference is a pervasive cultural fact. Sometimes we resolve problems resultant from such differences by making use of them. Is there a way of rethinking cultural relations in plural societies that could be illuminated and facilitated? Dialogue – yes, because there are situations in social dialogue that are surprising. To turn an idea of dialogue not into a resolving of conflict but as a technique of informing each other and in reaching each other's participation in a plural kind of collectivity. We have poor terminology for that and poor practice.

**Gottfried Wagner**

My personal feeling is that we have been discussing these issues for 15 years, and sometimes we are not much further on than we were 15 years ago. I do not fully understand why. On the other hand, I am quite sure that in the Netherlands we have overcome the worst. The last five years, starting with the murder of Pim Fortuyn, have shaken Dutch liberal society. The degree of loss of decency was shocking. But it was a necessary process, because political correctness prevented people from saying what they were suffering or afraid of. Here, on the continent, we have stopped

talking about many taboos in debates devoted to the Others. We cannot forget that in Europe we had earlier digested massive waves of immigration, and the differences are not to be overlooked, but the main reason why we have these problems at the moment is that globalisation is also distributing wealth and political power. If there were more favourable conditions on the global political scene, we would not need discussions on how to integrate our societies. It is true that cohesion is very much at stake. The core of the fear is the feeling that we might lose the cohesion of societies. That needs to be taken very seriously, but of course nobody is perfect at giving right answers. We are all in a process of negotiating differences, and what is most important is not to be alarmist; to be clear, questioning and reasonable, but to avoid alarmism. Behind some of the problems we put forward are other burgeoning struggles. Let's look at the problem Polish society has with the Roma community. The question of whether Roma girls should be allowed to get married at the age of 12 is grave, but there are other issues behind it. It is about hundreds of years of failed integration of the Roma community into our societies. We have to deal with that. Public opinion and the media concentrate on the peaks of trouble, but we should focus on everyday integration of minorities. For example, in Finland there is a Palestinian curator who deals with diversity issues in national museums; she says: 'our problem is, for example, those beautiful Scandinavian women with a long history of fighting for women's rights, claiming to be the gatekeepers for everything that concerns equality, liberty and freedom. They make our lives really hard.' Even the best intentioned achievements can turn out to make things more complicated. Going back to the issue of naming things and phenomena: the names might be important, but whatever good name we find, as long as we do not find ways to address problems by their substance, naming does not help at all.

#### **Zdzisław Mach**

The reason why we have been talking about it for so many years is that we do not have one, wonderful solution everybody would be perfectly happy with. It is a matter of certain process and direction. Even those directions are often controversial. If I have a choice between collective and individual freedoms, I will choose individual ones. I agree with Professor Barth that the right to exit a group is absolutely essential. Of course, one can say that it weakens the group when its members are tempted to join the outside world, and sometimes we have the feeling that if I am a member of a mainstream society, and I decide to convert into a minority culture or religion, I am allowed to do it. However, if I decide to do the opposite – to leave the minority group and join the mainstream, to assimilate, it is seen as somehow morally dubious.

**We are all in a process of negotiating differences, and what is most important is not to be alarmist; to be clear, questioning and reasonable.**

**There is no such thing as a culturally homogenous group.**

People who happen to belong to a minority and who would like to make use of their individual rights are under pressure from the leaders of their group, and from society outside that, tell them that it is their moral duty to remain in the group.

Secondly, we have to remember that there is no such thing as a culturally homogenous group. When we claim that more freedom and democracy should be introduced to a group, we may be accused of being Eurocentric. It is the group that matters, not the individual – one might say. We do not believe this; since the Enlightenment individualism has been the core of the way we see society. We have the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union, but some countries, including Poland, decided it would not be applicable there. Nevertheless, there are many critics who say that in the Charter there are no values. It is not true – there are many values, but they are individual ones. What are missing are collective values. People representing mainstream European society, for example, strong believers in the catholic church, believe that the values of family, nation, group are above individual principles.

#### **Gottfried Wagner**

What is the framework of reference of assimilation or cohesion? It is the nation state. Cultural diversity means that every respected nation has its right to have its language spoken in the European institutions, including Irish, for example. What would you do with many other languages: are they included in the diversity which we respect and promote or not? Where would you draw the boundary? The problem is that we are living in a transition period from nation states, which will remain strong for many years; and at the same time all the nation states will agree voluntarily to cede power to the newly formed entities. We are living in a transcultural, transnational period based on nation states. This is why it is so difficult in Europe to define what you mean by cultural diversity. Is it just Polish, or is it also Romanese?

#### **Zdzisław Mach**

Largely, you are right that, for the most part, the nation state is still the framework of reference, but the process of European integration is changing this. The legal framework is under construction and we are more inclined to look at such issues as human rights from an international perspective. I know it is complicated, but there is a change also in international law. Today, it is more and more acceptable to intervene with what we call the internal affairs of a sovereign state to protect human rights. Some years ago it was not regarded as acceptable. The legal and institutional frameworks of reference are changing, and it is Europe that starts to be



the framework of reference. This is why we want European integration. But we have to respect human rights, even if integration is far from being complete.

#### **George Kolankiewicz**

Are there any lines drawn in the sand for liberal market-based democracies? In the UK now there are serious discussions about introducing shariat law alongside the national legal system for self-regulation of communities. Is that acceptable within a situation where the rule of law underpins citizenship in a way very few other things do. Secondly, there is capitalism. As you know we now have people who are given rights by multinational corporations to refuse service if it goes against conscience. I am not served alcohol at the check-out point because you are of a religious organisation which forbids consuming alcohol. Providing medical services in cases that are either alcohol-induced or are associated with it; and I am not indicating it as something that has to do with the Muslim community, because there are other groups that are refusing that. We come to a point where some very important processes are on the way which, I would argue, are qualitatively different to the questions of cultural, collective rights. These points seem to be quite important signifiers for me.

#### **Karolina Czerska**

I was born in Poland but grew up in Canada and now I am undergoing a kind of identity crisis, because in Canada, multiculturalism and multiculturalist thought are ingrained in the educational system. It was always something positive for me, and as I was growing up, multiculturalism had a very positive meaning. Suddenly, a few years ago, we proclaimed the death of multiculturalism and I thought I had to readjust. Then, there were other words like interculturalism that I thought sounded very similar to multiculturalism. What is the fundamental difference between interculturalism, multiculturalism and pluralism? Is the base of multiculturalism, which should be the promotion of cultural heritage to better integrate into the society a legitimate one for integration, and if not, what is the legitimate base for living in a multicultural society?

#### **Les Levidow**

The debate on multiculturalism always has an explicit or implicit racist framework, assuming that European culture is civilised by contrast to some non-European cultures. However, as we can see from many examples the conflict of cultural values goes on intensively within Europe itself. As someone mentioned, member states are entitled to ignore, or violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights. What does it mean for European values?

**The debate on multiculturalism always has an explicit or implicit racist framework, assuming that European culture is civilised by contrast to some non-European cultures.**

#### **Deidree McQuillan**

My question is directed to Professor Wikan. I am interested in your views on the veil. We know about the controversies around it in France, but it is always focused on young girls.

#### **Unni Wikan**

My view on the veil is that it is legitimate. I would respect cultural and religious diversity and so I have nothing against girls wearing the headscarf, although I would wish they would not do it, because I do know many young girls are being compelled by their brothers to wear it. If they do not wear them, they may be harassed in public by other men. I would not prohibit wearing the headscarf, and it is not prohibited in Scandinavia, although I saw a study from Uppsala, which said that about 50% of the people who had been questioned felt that it should be banned in Sweden. Nevertheless, the full head veil is permitted neither in Norway, Denmark and Sweden, nor in most countries in the Middle East. I do not see it as a problem. On the other hand, banning the headscarf would cause a backlash and create problems.

In Britain you are going in the wrong direction if you are going to accept shariat law. As we all know, shariat can be interpreted in different ways. For example, it can be interpreted in such a way that it facilitates liberty for women, but that is not what is happening in the world. Shariat is being interpreted conservatively. It promotes privileges of men around the world and, due to this, enables polygamy and dissuades women from divorcing. Introducing shariat law would mean supporting ethnic group leaders, who are to large extent financed by countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Pakistan. A great problem in my country is that mosques are financed by these countries. Introducing shariat law would undermine democratic and secular movements within the Muslim community.

The legitimate base for multiculturalism is to promote cultural diversity in the same way as language diversity: helping and facilitating people to take pride in their cultural heritage. But we have to remember the right of an individual to exit a group and that an individual should not be sacrificed on the altar of community. The situation in Europe is now more serious than it has been, because new modes of communication facilitate communication between enclaves and communities here and the clans back home. We have to go for integration and equal human rights as a basis for it, and this is not in conflict with cultural diversity.

**The legitimate base for multiculturalism is to promote cultural diversity in the same way as language diversity: helping and facilitating people to take pride in their cultural heritage.**

### **Fredrik Barth**

Let me focus on the issues of conscience and fundamental moral values in a cultural pluralist context. I agree with the objection to shariat law. But what about abortion? I think it would be outrageous in European society to have a law that enforces abortion. It seems to me that any act you can refrain from, you do not need an absolute right to practice it. Many of these things evaporate if you subject them to public discussion, and we must retain our option of taking collective, public decisions that refer, so far, to national state units. I think the trend to make these things global is necessary. A sense of shared, global responsibility must be developed. What should it specify? We cannot foresee. It is going to take a lot of work to articulate it, but this is work that has to be done, because these are the realities emerging in life now. Some of the negotiations will inevitably be provisional.


Perhaps Polish immigration to England and Norway is a happy story, it is a happy story in the case of Norway, because Norway needs labour. In a quasi-capitalist system, when there is an excess of available labour, certainly immigrants will not be welcomed. How much should we commit ourselves never to change the openness that has now been created? Should we say: it is too late; it is how it is going to be? We cannot do that. We cannot totally remove the ability of a constituted society and political unit to try to cope with the realities of the contemporary world.

I think if we can make our political discussion address the issues that are emerging and are necessary to clarify, some of the old problems will evaporate, or get lost. We may have a chance to create institutions that can function better.

### **Zdzisław Mach**

I agree with former speakers that the law must be integrated, and shariat law opens up dangers of the abuse of human rights. Also, the rule of law happens to be the pillar on which we, as a society, rest. Of course, we can say everything is negotiable, but I would hesitate to go as far as this. We must be always aware that we are making assumptions; we are making our own cultural principles; not only human rights, but also gender equality, which is based on the principle that men and women should be equal and be given equal rights. I endorse it completely, but I know there are many people who do not. But I am not going to give this principle up only because there are some people who do not agree with me. I do it because I do not think I am doing anybody any harm.

I have nothing against headscarves, but I have a lot against covering the face in public places. Communication is largely based on seeing each other's faces. If we accept that women of certain groups are forced by their community – parents, brothers etc. – to cover their faces, it significantly diminishes their chances to be integrated into society. They will be excluded. Tradition is one thing, but for me the price is too heavy to pay.






**Oleksandr Hrycenko, Les Levidow**




**Paddy Coulter**



**Karoline Gil, Joanna Krawczyk**



**Fredrik Barth**



DEBATE IV

# The Post-utopian Europe

The spectre of America  
The spectre of neo-liberal capitalism  
The spectre of populism – can democracy be saved?  
Is just Europe possible?

**Janusz Majcherek, moderator**

What are the ghosts that haunt Europe today? The ghost of America? Are you sure that America is a ghost and not a real being? Maybe it is not fear of America but our imagination of it. It is quite a different question. What about the ghost of neo-liberal capitalism, of neo-liberal consensus? Maybe this is simply freedom of economics; this is simply the free market? And what about populism? Populism is not specific to Eastern Europe. Jean Marie le Pen and Jörg Haider are not Eastern Europeans. Last but not least... the last question – is just Europe possible?

**Olexandr Hrycenko**

In my opinion, the ghost of America in contemporary people's minds is to a great extent overlapped by the ghost of globalisation. Many people believe that globalisation is a project conceived and promoted by free market liberals in the West. This vision coincides to a great extent with the vision of globalisation promoted by some Kremlin-sponsored Russian types of political terrorists. In their opinion globalisation is a kind of conspiracy behind which stands, of course, the White House, the CIA, the International Monetary Fund; not to forget Hollywood, McDonald's and, perhaps, Microsoft. There are different points of view on globalisation and on America's role in it.

**the ghost of America in contemporary people's minds is to a great extent overlapped by the ghost of globalisation.**

What I like most is the description of globalisation not as a project but as a mix of complicated processes and terrains on which these processes evolve. This is a vision proposed by an American culture theorist named Arjun Appadurai. He says that the globalisation is a set of processes or, as he says, landscapes in different fields, which includes finanscape: the landscape of global finances, the system of world currencies, of international banks. Down to the constellation of ATMs enabling the ordinary citizen to transfer their money earned on one part of the globe to goods purchased in a completely different part of the world. The other 'scape' is what he calls the technoscape: the process of the occurrence and spreading of new technologies. In the industrial age there were materials produced with technologies. Today technologies are products in themselves. They pop up in one place invented by some smart people and are immediately spread over the globe where they can be used by either globalist or anti-globalist, by Americans or Taliban, whoever. Another one is the so-called mediascape, which includes the systems of new electronic media, most specifically the Internet, television, as well as traditional media – there are dozens of popular magazines printed simultaneously in many regional languages. Last but not least are the ethnoscapes and ideascapes which, according to Arjun Appadurai include the global landscape of migrations and multinational communities, the multicultural and multi-linguistic communities in virtually all the great cities throughout the world. And what is important is that these ethnic communities are rather reluctant to assimilate. They remain more or less as they used to be; they keep their culture, languages, religion, they maintain deep connections with their home countries. It also creates a very specific situation: it facilitates the spread of different ideologies. It is not only free market liberalism that spreads all over the world according to Fukuyama or other ideologists. Islamic fundamentalism also benefits from this mediascape; from the technoscape and ethnoscapes of this complicated globalisation process.

Is America either a ghost or a real thing that benefits from this kind of globalisation more than other countries? Whether we say yes or no, the real answer is much more complicated. Perhaps the truth is that America is more exposed to the rest of the world than the rest of the world is exposed to America, to American influence? In my opinion America, not the ghost but the real country, the real nation, behaves less and less like the only superpower, but more like a normal nation state. How do they react to the invasion of Chinese goods? Just like a normal state with some protectionist measures. How did they react to the invasion of Mexican immigrants – they built a wall. And so it goes. I do not think there is any ghost of America that is behind all this globalisation. Onto the ghost of populism. Professor David Ost has said that the

**One of the basic messages of Marxism which is that private property is both unfair and ineffective.**

Left has always been about inclusion. To be inclusive you have to include into this notion of the Left not only intellectuals of the Western Left but also the left in the countries they used to rule and in some countries they still continue to rule. When we look not only at what these people say but also what they do – they have been rather more exclusive than inclusive. They used to pick on some social groups and tell them they were reactionary, that they should be excluded from power, property, whatever, even from their human existence. My point is that the one of the important features of these leftist regimes is that they pretended to one of the basic messages of Marxism which is that private property is both unfair and ineffective. Unfair because property is a result of theft and ineffective because market regulations waste much wealth – they do regulate economies but they waste a lot of what people produced in the process. Once replaced with a centralised controlled economy it will be more efficient. This actually did not happen and everybody believes it is over; that there will be no chance for regulated centralised economies in these populist authoritarian states. However, my opinion is that globalisation creates a second chance for these left-wing populist authoritarian regimes. Those who are still in power under the condition that they manage to run their countries as big corporations in the globalised market. Some of them have succeeded – look at China, Vietnam, down to Belarus and – the most recent example – Hugo Chavez's Venezuela where he is also trying to transform the country into a corporation. To achieve success in this a populist left authoritarian regime has to accomplish four things. Firstly they have to have control over their citizens as employees, and as the workforce, as a disciplined hardworking unpretentious workforce. It is more relevant in China and Vietnam for instance, perhaps less relevant for Venezuela. Another important and valuable asset that such a successful regime can have is natural resources. There is no disciplined and hardworking workforce in Russia but there are enormous natural resources. They exert complete control over their rich national resources so that they can win on the global market. The third thing they have to accomplish is securing a niche in the global market and starting to offer products and services within that niche; the profits they gain should then be redistributed to secure public support for their regime. Lukashenka, for instance, was rather successful and Putin is getting more and more successful in doing so. They can achieve success by these populist measures, by selling their products or their cheap and efficient workforce on the world market. The profit of this big nation state corporation can then be used for political purposes, for creating a stable and sustainable political base for this regime.

There is a question mark in the programme – is there any chance for democracy, even in such regime? Such successful corporation states depend very much on the global market, they cannot exist without the globalised free market. That is why they cannot be isolated as communist regimes used to be and depend very much on the rules that exist in the world. On the other hand they have to spend more and more on winning political support, which can make them economically inefficient, so this makes a real chance for democracy, even in such regimes.

Finally, I would like to make reference to a specific Ukrainian experience on the above-mentioned ghosts. This experience can be put in a number of 'binary oppositions'. One is the ghost of America versus the ghost of Russia. Which ghosts exist in the popular mentality in my country? For some people the ghost of America is a friendly ghost – you know the cartoons about Casper. This is America for one part of Ukrainians but for the other part it is an evil ghost. Russia is vice versa – it is a friendly ghost for many people in Donetsk, and especially for most people in Crimea. It is not so in Kiev or in Western Ukraine. The difference between these two ghosts is that the friendly or evil American ghost is more like a ghost than a real walking creature. The real presence of America either politically or economically is not very important in Ukraine and cannot be compared to the presence of Russia with its strong and continuous political influence down to its enormous presence in the Ukrainian pop-culture market. To counter-balance, to disguise this overwhelming presence of Russia some pro-Russian political 'technologists' have to create and recreate this American ghost and project people's fears and negative stereotypes onto that ghost. . Which is worse: the ghost of liberal capitalism or the ghost of oligarchic capitalism? I do not know. It depends. On one hand, the ghost of liberal capitalism offers investments, although it is also quite reluctant to invest a lot in a country like Ukraine. On the other hand, a normal civilised market economy should develop in a normal free market democratic country. These rules differ very much from what oligarchic capitalism can offer, and what it really offers. But, paradoxically, when we look at some particular cases it seems that sometimes this civilised free market capitalism could have had a more negative impact on a transforming economy, on some sectors of the Ukrainian economy, than oligarchic capitalism in fact had. Let us look at old-fashioned Ukrainian heavy industries inherited from the Soviet Union. Supposing that we deal with them as the liberal market theorists advise us to do (it would be like what happened to the coal and steel industries in Britain under Margaret Thatcher). But what happened instead was that these evil oligarchic guys bought or took these big plants, these dinosaurs of centralised industrial economy and

**Which is worse: the ghost of liberal capitalism or the ghost of oligarchic capitalism?**

converted them into profitable industries. There were not allowed to enter into civilised European markets but they found other markets elsewhere in the globalised world – they went to Asia, Latin America, to the Middle East, and they effectively revitalised the economy and the social life of whole regions of Ukraine. So, it is also rather a controversial thing as to whether oligarchic capitalism or civilised free market capitalism is a bigger or lesser evil for the economy.

**Jan Sowa**

I decided to focus on one thing. I have chosen to talk about populism – populism as a danger to democracy – and how we can actually save democracy from the dangers of populism. This theme of populism reappeared throughout the conference. As a matter of fact populism as a major force is a sort of new political phenomenon – we have Le Pen in France, we have Haider in Austria, Pim Fortuyn in Holland, we have the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, we have PiS in Poland. This is not only a left wing problem as Olexandr suggested; we have right wing populism as well. You said: state, left wing, interventionist populist government. We can say there is a resemblance to 30 years of Nazism and Fascism – not formal, not necessarily material, but can be seen in the way of mobilising the population to support the programme. Populism is a very vague term and I agree with what professor Krasnodębski said yesterday that we have to define the terms in order to have an interesting discussion. In a way the German language has a good way to describe what this kind of notion is – *Kampfbegriff*: a notion that is invented and used solely for the purpose of fighting the enemy. However, we can define populism in a positive way. What I mean by populism is a political strategy for gaining power that consciously and purposefully refers to real and popular problems – feelings, attitudes and fears – not only refers to them but actually reinforces them. However populism has no substantial and real programme to significantly improve the situation. Populism is pure cynicism and it corresponds very well with the post-modern mindset that German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk rightly recalled: that a post-modern reason is a cynical reason. Populism is post-modern politics at its best, signifiants without signifiés, it is a surface without any depth, it is the outside without an inside – without any reference to the real world. Populism does not have any real programme but only false answers. This is why I think populism does not have any ideology; it is totally auto-referential. Populism is its own ideology. And this is precisely why it leads itself to all forms of political orientation – left and right. Left and right in Hegel's meaning. We have rationality and we have reality and the Left thinks that rationality should prevail over what is real and the Right thinks what is real should prevail over what

**Populism is pure cynicism and it corresponds very well with the post-modern mindset that German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk rightly recalled: that a post-modern reason is a cynical reason.**

is rational. So, we should adjust our minds to what it is. By saying that populism is post-modern I do not mean that it is anti-modern. I use this word rather in the sense that Peter Sloterdijk or Jacques Ranciere used it. Post-modernism draws full conclusions and unintended consequences from modernity. Sloterdijk uses the example of traffic jams. Nobody ever wanted to have traffic jams, nobody planned them, they are unintended consequences, however, we cannot say they are anti-cars; they are a conclusion, a consequence of using cars.

Now we could ask what is wrong with populism? I do not think of particular solutions that populism enforces because in most cases there are none, they do not really change anything. We can see a Polish example: PiS made Zyta Gilowska the minister of finance. She would have been minister even if PO had won the elections. So it does not really change anything. Populism has two dangers. It is a decrease of politics; it diverts people's attentions from real problems towards false problems. It introduces a sort of stalemate – we are not making progress, we are not always making things worse but we are not concentrating on the real problems. The second problem is that populism reinforces discontent and creates false enemies. The Polish minister of foreign affairs saying that Germany was Poland's perennial enemy. Xenophobia, anti-Semitism – populism uses fear and despair as a base for political mobilisation, so they actively stimulate them. This phenomenon of populism has been researched and explained. I will quote two explanations that I will refer to later on. Chantal Mouffe rereads Carl Schmitt: she says that the problem is that within the dictatorship of liberal consensus, that is the consensus of the centre, people cannot recognise themselves. They do not see their problems represented by the elites, they do not see emotions in the politics (and they need emotions), so they turn to populism. I think it is definitely true that in the current configuration of the political system no major political force represents the interests and aspirations – especially economic aspirations – of the important part of the population. I do not agree with Chantal Mouffe in her emphasising the role of conflict and divisions within society – take the example of India. You can say a lot of things about India, but still you have the Bharatiya Janata Party, a populist party existing in an environment that is as far from liberalism as you can imagine, full of internal conflicts that are too close to actually tell them apart and a lot of social institutions and cultural norms that are far from a liberal consensus.

I do not think that divisions and quarrels and disagreement itself can protect us from populism. Now we have another explanation by David Ost in a very interesting book 'The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Post-Communist Europe'. I think that

**Populism uses fear and despair as a base for political mobilisation, so they actively stimulate them.**

along with Lawrence Goodwyn's 'Breaking the barrier. The Rise of Solidarity in Poland' it is an essential book to understand current developments in Poland and Central-Eastern Europe. I will summarise, well, Professor Ost is with us, but I will give just a brief summary of his explanations. We have had in Poland a failure of the elite, even a betrayal: in the 1980s the intellectuals united with the workers to fight the Soviet regime; in the 1990s they completely abandoned the workers and took sides with the neoliberal orthodoxy. Workers were consciously treated as cannon fodder. Of course transformation was incredibly costly in social terms. Professor Tadeusz Kowalik says that the Polish transformation was the worst transformation in the Soviet block. So what happened, the victims of the transformation turned their backs on the elites – both the establishment and the ex-opposition – and they embraced populism, which is a sort of natural reaction. Populism created false enemies, we see them all around: 'uklad', 'oligarchs', 'secret agents', 'Germans', 'Russians', they trans-located the frustration towards false enemies and the important thing is that the economy has never been presented as an oppressive and victimising force. Blame for social evil has always been turned away from economic forces and diverted through ideological channels elsewhere. This argument has actually been used before by Jacques Ranciere in the book 'On the Shores of Politics', written in 1988, that argues that artificial suppression of economic divides stimulates forces of social exclusion. According to Professor Ost a solution is to rearrange the divisions within society to follow the economical divisions of real interest. I think this solution is right, a very good proposition. However, I think it is not feasible within the current political system – that is my objection, the system of liberal parliamentary democracy.

**Janusz Majcherek**

What should change in this system?

**Jan Sowa**

That is what I want to say. I do not think it is a flaw in the system, I think it is the system's design not to be able to represent certain things. We go back to the moment when political modernity was established, the American Revolution. It was not a democratic revolution; it was an anti-democratic revolution in the sense of the rule of the people. I have quotations from the Federalist Paper No. 10 written by Madison 'The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection' and he says that a true distinction between ancient democrats and American governments lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any show in the government. They were afraid of social revolution, and even that



would significantly flatten the class structure and efficiently redistribute wealth. So actually they prevented the interest of the represented through the elites. This gets combined with quite a recent development which is the rule of the media. This is within the last three decades. Who really do people vote for? They do not vote for people, they do not vote for politicians, because they do not know them. They do not vote for programmes because they do not read them. They vote for media images. I think this fact gives rise to the final course of parliamentary politics and the final nail in the coffin of any emancipatory politics – this is political marketing. Populists are helped and made by the marketing specialists. In Poland Andrzej Lepper was made a big politician by Piotr Tymochowicz, who is known to the public as someone who can turn any random individual into a big politician.

So we have two flaws: an essential flaw that is the lack of possibility to articulate real economic divides and interest through the system. And we have a contingent historic flaw, which is the rule of the media, which gives political marketing great force. What do we have to do to change this? I think we should make an effort at democratisation of what we call democracy and make this system actually able to represent the interests of the people. I do not think that politicians are actually any solution, I rather think they are the part of the problem. The politicians that could lead the people, could represent their interests are gone, because they cannot pass the media test. There is a whole system of more participatory, more direct democracy that lets people decide for themselves, not through their representatives, a system that Bhikhu Parekh, an English political theorist, calls 'representative government' – we can only express our concern or lack of concern with the rule of certain people. What I think would change the situation is to make the governing system a system of direct participation through representatives, but representatives that are bound by certain agreements with the population they represent, actually bringing everything further down so their interests can really be represented. It is a system that works in municipal areas, it works pretty well in Brazil, in some places in France and in Southern America.

#### **Paul Gillespie**

I have read translations of the Communist manifesto. I remember the first English translation had rendered a spectre as a terrible hobgoblin strolling thorough Europe. But that, of course, was within a frame of reference. What I want to do is address – in terms of the future of Europe – and particularly the construction of the European Union. We have not talked about this issue during the conference. But firstly, I would like to give you a quotation by Oscar Wilde from his *The Soul of Man under Socialism*.

**A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing.**

His wonderful passage where he talks about man being a slave of machinery and he wants to invert that machinery into one that does all the necessary and unpleasant work, eliminating that boring work and allowing man to concentrate on the aesthetic, on the beautiful and to work as a free human being. 'Is this Utopian? A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.' I think this is the necessary antidote to the assumption built into the idea of post-utopianism. Now, where does it come from? Post-modernism: I do not know its genealogy exactly, but it is more used in Eastern and Central Europe than in Western Europe; it says that Utopia is either useless or empty dreaming that perhaps necessarily leads to authoritarian solutions or indeed the authoritative might be that it leads to Fukuyama's type of market place, Utopianism. I think we need to abandon that cynicism; I prefer the notion that refers to the possibility of different and better futures. I quote Adorno: 'An emancipated society, on the other hand, would not be a unitary state, but the realisation of universality in the reconciliation of differences'. One has to add further that Czesław Miłosz was anti-utopian. It seems to me that reading his *Captive Mind* is a critique of Stalinism not from a liberal vision or right vision but from a left-wing position. I will quote another reference on Utopia from Ernst Bloch who said that 'reality without real possibility is not complete; the world without future-laden properties does not deserve a glance'. Can such visions be applied at the macro-European level; in particular at the level of the European Union – which now, whether we like or not, has hegemonised much of the European space? How does Central and Eastern Europe fit into this? I would agree with Jeremy Rifkin in his book *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*, that the European dream can be made for a better world and that in his book he cautions Europeans against simply adapting neo-liberal arguments or the US model – it is another example of minds being captivated. I do not think that we should abandon research for the human face of capitalism. What he also describes in the book are the social advantages of capitalism. In many ways, as he argues, the pattern of European integration where you share on multilateral bases is a better fit for a world just coming to terms with the pressures of globalisation. It is an urgent task to prove and examine how that can be done and how efforts currently made can be improved.

Now we have the Reform Treaty emerging from the previous Constitution Treaty. Effectively, in the Reform Treaty, the symbolic language of the constitutional state-

like language and references are being removed but institutionally the content of this Reform Treaty is very similar to the previous one. But the effect of that retreat, if you like, from the constitutional symbolism and from the political commitment side it contained should not be faced up to too squarely. Political scientists usually distinguish between input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy being the politics or participation or involvement at mass at the lead level which creates the project. Output legitimacy flows from effective policies that are in line with public needs. By so changing the Treaty or retreat, if you like, to output policies, we will not have enough discussion about the big ideas we switch to make output legitimate. I would like to offer six ideas for discussion as to the task we face at the European level and these are visions or dreams, or big ideas. The first is precisely the issue of managing globalisation or managing capitalism. The structures that we have in place at the European level are to some extent adequate to that task in terms of scale but are they adequate in terms of content? Second, there is an opportunity for Europeans to lead the world discussion on, for example, global warming with these methods. Third, we need to reinvent social protection at the trans-national level. As we get to the movement of peoples around Europe exemplified by movement from Poland, we also get enormous anomalies and contradictions in the level of social protection. That is a very important task for the future that could be an antidote for populism. Fourth, we need a unified foreign policy along the lines we heard Kathinka Dittrich van Weringh set out yesterday and we have broad public support for that. The fifth point is to stabilise and develop not only the membership of the Union but also its vast neighbours to the North, East and South. Such ideas need debate by intellectuals from both East and West, so that they have strong public support in public surveys but this cannot be faced only by technocratic politics. If we have to try to create democracy at a trans-national level, it has to be along the lines at a national level. The sixth idea I would like to offer is a reason for me in research for a doctoral thesis completed last year at the University College Dublin on multiple political identities. There are many ways of being European. The French way is different to the Italian and to the Polish way and so on. And the dialogue about that is what makes the trans-national politics interesting. It seems to me that Central and Eastern Europe has a lot to offer in this debate but has not actually been offered. It is time we heard more of that. It is possible for Ireland to identify with Central and Eastern Europe because for many years we were also a land denigrated in the areas of irrational religious prejudice, nationalism and populism. Following the transformation of 1989 this we in Ireland suddenly saw that we were not alone with this problem in Europe; that behind the Iron Curtain there were many areas where you

had similar minority-majority conflicts, which led to mutual learning. It seems to me that the basic frame and norm for this kind of politics is a pluralist one rather than a multinational one. Pluralism, as I tried to explain in the earlier session, is a better grasp of the differences within nation states as well as between them. Kalypso Nicolaidis, a political theorist at Oxford University, talks not about new democracy at trans-national level but the combination of 'demois' in trans-national pluralism – the so-called demoi-cracy which is a better way of thinking about the entangled politics of the future than a federal solution or populist new sovereigntist one.

#### **Les Levidow**

As the previous speaker said, the policies and institutions of the European Union have remained marginal to the proceedings. So, I will now focus on this as both a potential for progress and as a problem. Many people in Europe have idealised the European idea as an alternative to the neo-liberal project represented by the USA, in particular. And here neo-liberalism, in brief, means the promotion of market relations as the only possible base for society, whereby all relations are defined by the market, we all become business partners, business competitors, clients, customers and so on.

The European Union has rightly been seen as a possible arena for at least limiting this neo-liberal project and perhaps creating an alternative. However, if we want to take this alternative seriously, we must conduct a critical analysis of the institutions as they have developed over the last decade. The European social model, in particular, has been named a slogan expressing the idea of the alternative society, an alternative to the neo-liberal version. The European Union espouses principles of social justice, social solidarity, human rights, civil liberties and so on, but in practice and in law, in legal applications, these principles are generally marginalised or even worse. The European social model was originally promoted as a social democratic alternative to neo-liberalism, but step by step it has actually been turned into an instrument of that project. The original phrase was promoted in particular by Jacques Delors whilst president of the European Commission in the early 1990s, whereby he promoted a plan for industrial regeneration and economic competitiveness in the European communities that were about to become the European Union. Its role was to promote industrial restructuring, market liberalisation and expansion of employment, along with measures for social solidarity across regions, across social classes and guarantees of employment rights, especially through the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. The Social Chapter formalised the idea that social progress could be achieved

**The European social model, in particular, has been named a slogan expressing the idea of the alternative society, an alternative to the neo-liberal version.**

through the market liberalisation of European industry and that it could protect workers' rights and protect social welfare from the extremes of market exploitation and individualisation which have characterised US neo-liberalism. The whole idea of the European social model succeeded ideologically in incorporating most trade unions and parties of the left into the project of the Maastricht Treaty, supporting European integration in the way they accepted the new neo-liberal elements, which were seen as a problem, as their source of suffering, at least in the short term through unemployment, injustice and so on, but perhaps there were temporary difficulties that could be eventually overcome. In this way the potential mass opposition to that project was incorporated, marginalised and silenced. At the same time, the European social model has been turned into the opposite of those aspirations as represented by the Social Chapter. It has actually become in target of modernisation – modernisation so-called meaning neo-liberal globalisation. For example, it now seems to me that individuals must be helped or if necessary coerced into developing entrepreneurial skills in order to sell their labour more effectively as individuals on the labour market.

I will go on to another area of European policy to illustrate why European integration is now part of the problem not the solution. The so-called security policies, in particular, starting with changes in migration rules have rightly been attacked because they effectively make it difficult or even impossible for refugees to claim asylum. The harmonisation regime spreads the worst examples of denied refugee status rather than spreading the best examples of recognised refugee status. The whole regime has been rightly attacked as a deportation machine which tries to prevent refugees from even reaching the borders of the EU in the first place. So, it is actually designed to create insecurity, to make European citizens feel insecure about the threat of migrants coming here and to make potential or actual migrants feel insecure about coming to or being in the EU. In parallel, there has been the development of the so-called counter terror regime as part of the wider security regime. This reached a turning point after the 11 September attacks in the USA, when the EU Council enacted a key law which effectively broadened the definition of terrorism to include normal critical activities and any support for national liberation movements against the regime abroad. Moreover, any individual organisation suspected of involvement in such activities anywhere in the world becomes classified as terrorist. And this was formalised in the list of so-called terrorist individuals and organisations which were issued as part of that law. This requires member states to freeze the bank accounts of anyone suspected of involvement in any of the groups on that

**The so-called security policies, in particular, starting with changes in migration rules have rightly been attacked because they effectively make it difficult or even impossible for refugees to claim asylum.**

**Every summit of the European Union has been met by protest from a counter-summit, where activists from that Europe meet each other, compare experiences and try to plan a more effective resistance on a European scale at the same time as developing imaginary visions of a progressive Europe.**

list. This immediately changes the asylum regime because people who had been targeted by repressive regimes abroad could try to enter the EU by saying 'I was a part of this movement which was fighting against a regime and therefore I have reason to fear prosecution if I were returned to that regime'. Now, if they were to make such a statement, they would be prosecuted as terrorists for activities no different from those carried out before that change in the law in December 2001.

In effect, the so-called anti-terror regime turns resistance against oppression into terrorism. At the same time, it incorporates or justifies alliances between EU member states and repressive regimes in the name of anti-terrorism. That includes the Israeli prosecution and occupation of the Palestinians, the Turkish state terrorism against the Kurds, Indian state terrorism against Kashmiris and Sikhs, Colombian state terrorism against the workers and peasants who are opposing environmental destruction. All these people around the world are immediately disqualified – or easily disqualified – from refugee status, and anyone involved in supporting those kinds of resistance in Europe can find that their bank account is frozen. In this way they are effectively deprived of living as free citizens within the EU and they become non-persons or worse. In this way, migrants and Muslim communities in general are turned into suspect communities much as the Irish were treated as the suspect community during the Long War in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s.

I will move on now to positive alternatives. Alternatives are no longer possible within simply the national framework. The right wing populism that you describe illustrates the inherent limitations of the national framework. Fortunately, there is now a decade-long list of experience of European networks, of resistance and solidarity. Every summit of the European Union has been met by protest from a counter-summit, where activists from that Europe meet each other, compare experiences and try to plan a more effective resistance on a European scale at the same time as developing imaginary visions of a progressive Europe. These efforts gained ground in the Zapatista Uprising in 1994, when they declared one global 'no' against neo-liberal globalisation. Further impact came from the World Social Forum with the slogan 'Another World is Possible' and this leads to the first of several European Social Forums in 2002 in Florence. The European Social Forums have become the basis for developing much more strategic forms of European-scale interventions, such as the 'No Borders' movement which links migrants' rights groups throughout Europe, or movements against the post-European constitution which would have given constitutional status to the principles of market liberalisation and militarism, which go

hand in hand because a European military state would be very helpful for reinforcing those principles throughout the world in the interest of multinational companies based in the EU.

What has been a role played by the intelligentsia around Europe? Unfortunately, such people have moved away from an earlier critical response to adopting the problems of the elite as if these were the same as society's problems of conflict management, public distrust and so on, thereby losing sight of the possibility that even society's problems could be understood in quite different ways, namely the problems of those who resist neo-liberal globalisation and try to develop alternatives. I invite people here, and the European intelligentsia, to take a more humble approach, which means learning from the experiences of European networks of resistance and solidarity, and by attending counter-summits, the mobilisations around the European Social Forum using your skills and imagination to make a contribution to the development of a possible different Europe.

#### **Janusz Majcherek**

My question concerns the future and enlargement. Do you think is it possible to guarantee a better future for Europe without enlargement of the European Union and where is the border of that enlargement? Where is the border of the future Europe? Is Ukraine ready to be a member of the EU?

#### **Olexandr Hrycenko**

The answer is no. For the first question, there is a typical American answer to many serious questions, which is 'I don't know, and I don't care'. What do I care about? I do not have European dreams. What I as a Ukrainian citizen dream about is less corruption in the government, in politics, a more sound economy, less arrogance among people, a lot of things which are more substantial than being or not being the member of the European Union. If joining the European Union really helps in this then I am surely for it. If no, then I see no reason other than a symbolic one in joining the EU.

#### **Janusz Majcherek**

Is a better future for Europe possible without enlargement of the European Union?

#### **Jan Sowa**

I am in favour of enlargement, I am in favour of accepting Turkey into the EU. If we reinvent utopia and imagination, I think the natural shape for the EU is the Mediterranean Union – culturally and historically. If we think about defining a common

space where we can include not our enemy but our adversary, then this is the same reason why I am in favour of enlargement and taking Turkey into the EU. But I think that sort of development is the utopian and imaginary goal. I do not think it should happen too quickly. I think Europe has a lot of internal problems to solve. I do not think that any enlargement is going to happen sooner than the next 15-20 years.

#### **Danuta Glondys**

I remember the time when we were waiting 'in the queue' to join the European Union and the same sentence as you said now that Europe has to deal with its internal affairs was pronounced by French, Spanish or English politicians. Exactly the same argument was used against the quick enlargement of the EU against us

#### **Jan Sowa**

Yes, but it depends what is quick in historical terms. Was it quick to wait 15 years to let ex-soviet countries in or was it not quick? I think that actually there is quite a lot that Poland can spoil in the European Union. Maybe it would be more effective on the global scale without these 10 new member states. From an internal perspective I am not sure if it was so good for the EU to extend; I think it was motivated by a lack of labour force. I remember I was living in France in 2001, they were saying then 'better to take Polish, Slovak and Czech labour than more Arabs'. So that was a purely economical argument. But I think politically and culturally, it maybe – I do not want to pronounce it too strongly – it maybe spoils something.

#### **Janusz Majcherek**

Is enlargement of the European Union necessary for the better future of the EU?

#### **Paul Gillespie**

I think enlargement is necessary. It is going to be effective by the political contingences including for example the contingency of the election in Poland. If you keep drumming up, it is going to shift perceptions. I swear, in Europe it does, it reinforces certain prejudices against enlargement in, for example, France. I am in favour of Turkish entry. I think that it is for the medium term, that is 10-15 years, but you also must look at transformations just as you had in Central-Eastern Europe, at the dynamic of reforms that were introduced by the prospect of enlargement. That still applies very much in the Balkans. That is a really central aspect of their transformation and a value that outweighs some of the difficulties of adjustments and absorptions if you like. I certainly think the political time is going to be affected just by the contingences.

### **Les Levidow**

European enlargement is desirable if it is used as a means to enhance the progressive character of Europe as a whole including the accession countries. This has weakly been the case as we have seen for example in the case of this country. The member states are held accountable for their efforts to implement basic legislation on market liberalisation, free trade, the internal market and so on but they are not held accountable for the supposed principles of human rights, equality, women's rights, migrants, ethnic minorities and so on. In fact, if necessary for reasons of realpolitik, they expressly allow exceptions.

We have a similar contradiction now with the question of whether or under what terms Turkey should be admitted in order to access the EU? Do we tell their support for democracy in Turkey including the Kurds because they see this process at least as an extra means for them to demand or perhaps to even gain democratisation of the Turkish state? They are countering the paramilitary which has totally dominated the structures of the state since the beginning of the Kemalist regime. However, the debate in Europe has generally been misleading because the debate has been posed in the false terms of whether Islamic culture is compatible with democracy. We should be debating whether Kemalism is compatible with democracy. Kemalism is a regime ideology which was modelled after European fascism and somehow represents itself as progressive by claiming to be secular even though it is compatible with Islamic fundamentalism or even terrorism within Turkey. So we should be having a debate about the supposed democratic character, about both the EU as it now exists and the regimes that are claiming access to the European Union.

### **George Kolankiewicz**

I do not think we should be quite as tough on the EU – in particular on the European Commission – as we are in terms of migration. On the 17th of October in London something called 'The Migrant Integration Policy Index' will be published in terms of its British achievements. This is an index which deals with all the EU member states up until 2006 and therefore excludes Romania and Bulgaria and looks at the way in which third country nationals – not internal citizens – are dealt with by the member states on the basis of the 100 normative indicators dealing with legislation which is actually being passed and how every country in the EU can be ranked on a scale of something like one to four in the way it will apply those directives which are meant to be brought into practice through membership of the EU.

**European enlargement is desirable if it is used as a means to enhance the progressive character of Europe as a whole including the accession countries.**

**What is important is that the EU is slowly doing its best to effect normative standards in terms of indicators where people can say this is where you can improve, this is where you have improved, this is where you are allowed a long-term residence status.**

This is seen as the first step in some sense of transparency and we also know a sense of competitiveness because if Austria finds itself ranked quite low, quite often in the way it treats its third country nationals it may not bother in the short term, but in the long term it will actually be seen as being not quite up to scratch. What is important is that the EU is slowly doing its best to effect normative standards in terms of indicators where people can say this is where you can improve, this is where you have improved, this is where you are allowed a long-term residence status. I think what happens after the 1st of January, when Poland and other countries join the Schengen zone, may have an enormous influence on the expansion of Europe. That really will be a test case.

There are a lot of problems within social Europe and I take your point that it was used as a way to try to legitimise Europe socially and then get away with a totally different project. I think we have to come back to those elements. This is where the European intelligentsia can come into the debate. But the important thing is that the EU sees things which are important to its humanity and it is in the way it treats third country nationals, it is trying to do something in the best possible way.

### **Turkish student of the Jagiellonian University**

I think between Turkey and Europe there are perception differences in terms of the Kurds. Kurdistan is within Turkish territory and therefore we see Kurds as our citizens. Why should we have to define them as a minority? What is a minority? What do you mean by a minority? A population bigger than 10 million? They have equal rights as Turks. Kurds in Turkey are – we see them as our citizens.

### **Jan Sowa**

The Turkish government tries to get rid of the Kurdish problem in the way it fits quite well the post-modern linguistic term. In the national census they did not include the category Kurd only Highlander Turk. So it was a sort of manipulation that was supposed to get rid of them from the census. I think the policy of the EU is to allow people, minorities, cultural minorities to practise their culture and speak their language and practise their identity. Of course it does not imply the notion of strong multiculturalism that was discussed before. It is rather about diversity and plurality. I do not know if we really want to go into a discussion of the situation of the Kurds in Turkey but there are endless reports of international organisations that are neither Kurdish nor Turkish that show the way the Kurdish population is treated in Turkey – it does not fit European standards. It is not something we can discuss because it is the fact. So I do not think it needs more explanation.

### **Representing the Welsh minority in Krakow**

My question is more theoretical because over the last few days we have looked at 'The Captive Mind'. I think the conception has changed from homo sovieticus to now becoming something more, for example, the blind faith in liberal economics that has become orthodoxy. The fact that it is post-modern and very relativist as well. My question is how could the EU change to allow freed mind to function. Just to touch briefly again on one of the earlier sessions on the apartheid between the East and the West. I think to truly integrate it needs to be more a coming together of the countries within the EU and sharing their opinions to create and to allow us to function.

### **Paul Gillespie**

A very profound question. I refer you back to the quotation I gave from Adorno 'An emancipated society, on the other hand, would not be a unitary state, but the realization of universality in the reconciliation of differences.' The genius of the construction of the European Union is a very ambitious beginning from the construction of a political mechanism at the trans-national level that can actually begin to address this issue. We need to find a balance within the various levels of government status and political participation that are applied trans-nationally, it is regional within this trans-national space, it remains national and of course it is also sub-national. One of the tasks that I was suggesting for the next period is to recombine the national and the European levels more effectively. The way in which the elites have constructed European integration, a lot of the ideology, if you like, around the European federalism is based on the assumption that it is either a European federation eventually or a nation-state sovereignty. I think it is a false conception. It is necessary to recapture the sense of political ownership at the mass level. This is a very big demand, very big words. You have to answer with such generality, asking such a question, and I think talking at this level of intellectualism is a valuable observation. But how you go and do that is another matter. It involves a multiplication of political capacity at that trans-national level. That includes political parties. We do not have trans-national political parties which individuals can join. We have very little direct access, for example, to the Presidency of the Commission, and the Council. These ideas came up in the constitutional debate but they have never really got very far. We have a system of national leadership where the leaders look both ways, both to Brussels and back into the national space without linking the two. Of course, that is to maintain an elite control in a certain kind of way at the domestic level but actually the public must see through this. I would argue because disillusion and disenchantment with democracy produces a certain kind of political cynicism and

**One of the tasks that I was suggesting for the next period is to recombine the national and the European levels more effectively.**

**What Europe actually could change in its own functioning in order to help the world would be to redefine agricultural policy because the subsidies that rich countries including the European Union and United States give to agriculture, push down the world prices of agricultural products so low that in most countries it is not profitable to produce them.**

loss of trust. It has to be addressed and should be addressed at the trans-national level. That is a contribution to liberation or emancipation; whether we ever can find, the deliberated mind is another matter.

### **Natasha Poznav**

I have become concerned about what Europe can contribute to the survival of the world as a human enterprise so beyond the liberal mind, following on from the previous question but a bit wider.

### **Jan Sowa**

I think for sure Europe has got maybe not a progressive but a not so bad ecological policy and actually the way green energy is promoted by Europe, all sorts of green power stations in Poland exist only because of European Union regulations, because the government is forced to buy a certain amount of electricity from green power stations. Otherwise, in a purely market environment they would not develop. What Europe actually could change in its own functioning in order to help the world would be to redefine agricultural policy because the subsidies that rich countries including the European Union and United States give to agriculture, push down the world prices of agricultural products so low that in most countries it is not profitable to produce them. Mali would rather import corn from Spain or France than from Senegal. In Indonesia apples imported from the United States are cheaper than apples grown in Indonesia. Of course, it is not only the European Union, the United States has the same policy. It is not beneficial for the general population because in agriculture in Europe we have 4-5 percent of people working and 80 percent of all the money goes to 20 percent of this group. Actually one percent of the population gets an enormous amount of money – we had this discussion in Poland recently. Billions of euro are going to large agricultural corporations. This is something we could change in order to make the situation worldwide better, not only in Europe.

### **Paul Gillespie**

I would go back to the capacity of Europe to take a real political lead on the climate change agenda. I think that the political consensus around these issues in Europe is such that it is possible. I think that our experience with multilateralism that has been built on integration over the last 50 years also makes this the appropriate mechanism to deal with this subject. And the demand from the world's publics, including European publics, provides another opportunity. But somebody on a previous panel spoke about political leadership and I would underline that. If we were

into not determinism but contingency there are a lot of tasks that can only be undertaken by political leadership. It needs to be protected and pushed by the intelligentsia. With soft power protection that is possible. Of course, a lot of this is contested. I take the point about the way the social model, for example, has been inverted but I think it is far too simple to speak of a foreign European policy in a much more multiplural world than that in which the United States, which was a hegemony and still is in military sense but now is acting not as a kind of a war leader but as a super national interest. That opens a political space for the kind of contribution that I am suggesting is possible. And the same applies with the development of agriculture.

#### **Les Levidow**

The question about how Europe can better contribute to the rest of the world – that question really should be the topic of an entire conference. I would just give three brief examples of how such a contribution would require a significant change in policy.

The first example has already been mentioned – agricultural subsidies. Yes, reduce or better still eliminate all subsidies of agricultural exports which only harm the rest of the world; they may benefit market traders but give no benefit or even harm agricultural producers in the poor South. And better yet reallocate that subsidy to quality agriculture within Europe which would benefit people more generally here.

The second example has also been mentioned already – global warming, environmental technology and so on are even more important. The current system for carbon credits is basically used as a pretext for industrial developments which cause environmental destruction and dispossession of local people in the poor South. We are contributing little to the reduction of carbon emissions, so that whole system of carbon credits should be abolished. We could benefit the rest of the world.

Lastly – again this adds to the example I gave before – the security regime. The EU should recognise as legitimate the elected government of the Palestinian National Authority led by the Hamas party which has a majority. The EU has refused to recognise this regime thereby aligning itself with the Israeli occupation which likewise regards the PNA as legitimate and so contradicts its support of the European Union for democracy.

Those are just three of many examples of how the EU could contribute to the rest of the world – through a significant change in policies.

#### **Jan Sowa**

I think there is also a symbolic example. The European Union is still a beautiful example of utopian thinking, of a project that was conceived in the minds of the people and that is being realised and that is being extended and changed. I think this is also referring to the question about neo-liberal domination. A part of this domination is persuading us that we cannot imagine a different world, that what exists is necessary. In a way, not necessarily in all details, the European Union is breaking this dogma. We can imagine a different arrangement of borders, of relations and we can try to enact this. So this is a symbolic contribution.


#### **Marcin Galent**

I hope that European politics is not all about cynicism. I remember the Spanish government – Spanish society, for example, very strongly supported the last enlargement even though it was completely against their interests – one example. I have a question for Paul Gillespie because Irish society has become the second richest society in the world – according to the International Monetary Fund Ireland is the second most affluent society as far as per capita income is concerned. It has become so in a very short, very quick time. I would like to ask to what extent contemporary Irish society is aware of that fact that it is the richest society in Europe and to what extent it is ready to take over the role of Germans who are sponsoring the European Union.


#### **Paul Gillespie**

I visited Brussels recently with Alan Dukes who is now the head of the Institute of European Affairs in Dublin and was previously the deputy prime minister and the leader of the main opposition party. We were driving through the most salubrious part of Brussels and we suddenly said 'look, I always say to people who describe Ireland as one of the richest countries in the world, we maybe one of the richest but certainly not one of the wealthiest'. Just look at the accumulation of wealth represented in the centre of Brussels. That is a good point because we have had a huge two decades of development. And income levels certainly have gone very high so the distribution of wealth is now much more unequal than it used to be, the taxation regime tends to be very easy on those who were better-off, a lot of indirect taxation, the middle and lower-middle incomes have come up certainly, they benefit in some respect from lower taxation levels but also from the new forms of taxation. Most people know they are far better-off and are delighted that it is the case. That explains the outcome of the last election when the conservative right party got re-elected. But also people know that some of these ways are precarious because they have been

driven by the property boom in the last number of 4-5 years driving consumption based on credits. It is a society open to the risk of collapse of those kinds of values and there is a lot of dissatisfaction as well with the way the money has been spent. That is just the normal span of politics. Two hundred thousand Poles who have come to Ireland have found employment very readily. Many other people have come too. I think 400,000 plus in all. We now have a population which has ten percent or more people born outside Ireland and that has happened within ten years. That is in a way a revolutionary change. It is possible to argue that when you reach those kinds of percentages you get some kind of issues of accommodation of new comers. Particularly if you do get an economic downturn when you are going to get resentment about who keeps jobs and so on. It is a much richer society certainly in many ways, I suppose, and a much happier society but it is not one without risks.







**Stanisław Shushkevych, Kathinka Dittrich van Weringh**




**Ziyad Raouf, John Ralston Saul**



**Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick, George Kolankiewicz**



**Danuta Glondys, Ziyad Raouf**



ACCOMPANYING EVENT

# SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO AWARD

Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil in Poland  
Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden in Poland  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## **Communiqué on the Meeting of the Award Committee**

The meeting of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Award Committee took place at the Villa Decius in Krakow on 12 September 2007. The Award is conferred for an outstanding contribution to promoting peaceful co-existence and collaboration between peoples, religions and cultures.

The meeting was attended by:

Jakub Beczek on behalf of Ms. Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka, Undersecretary of State, Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland  
Sylwia Gajownik on behalf of Mr Stefan Wilkanowicz, President of the ZNAK Christian Culture Foundation  
Danuta Glondys, Director of the Villa Decius Association  
Krzysztof Görlich, Treasurer of the Villa Decius Association, on behalf of Professor Aleksander Koj, Chairman of the Villa Decius Association  
Janusz Kahl, Honorary Consul of Sweden in Krakow, on behalf of His Excellency Tomas Bertelman, Ambassador of Sweden in Poland

Mirosław Kowalski, Regional Director of PKO Bank  
Jan Piekło, Director of the Pauci Foundation  
John Surface, United States Vice Consul General, on behalf of Anne Hall, United States Consul General in Krakow  
Stanisław Trociuk, Deputy Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, on behalf of Dr Janusz Kochanowski, Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection  
Ernest Zienkiewicz on behalf of Mr Hiromitsu Mori, United National High Commissioner for Refugees in Poland

The Award Committee confirmed the receipt of 35 submissions, of which 7 were received in the "person" category and 28 in the "non-governmental organization" category. 18 NGOs were nominated for the Award (eleven submissions referred to the same organization).

The nominees were reviewed and, after voting, the Award Committee reached the following verdict:

Ms. Maryna Hulcia received The Sergio Vieira de Mello Award in the Person category. This candidate was submitted by the Polish Association of Legal Education.

The Magurycz Association received The Sergio Vieira de Mello Award in the NGO category. This candidate was submitted by the Social Affairs Office of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland.

#### **Grounds for the Award Committee's decision in the NGO category**

Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland  
Under-Secretary of State Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka

To Participants and Organizers

The picture of tombs overgrown with grass, broken matzevas and shattered crosses will haunt anyone who has seen it. And yet graveyards are silent witnesses to the history and culture of peoples of the past. Forgotten, moss-covered tombs are often the only source of memory and knowledge about their lives.

The Magurycz Association is dedicated to saving old graveyards from oblivion. By restoring to necropolises the respect that is rightfully theirs, the organization contri-

butes to preserving the dying heritage of cemetery art. They focus their efforts in areas that used to be melting pots of culture and religion: those of Boikos, Lemkos, Jews, Poles, Gypsies and Germans. By caring for graveyards, we, in a sense, repay our cultural debt. The Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland is well aware of this, as demonstrated by its support for organizations such as the Foundation for the Protection of Jewish Heritage or the Jewish Cemeteries Restoration Project, whose mission is to save the memory of the different peoples of Poland. Their efforts have led to the rededication or re-opening of Jewish cemeteries in towns such as Iwaniska, Wąchock or Izbica. This work must be brought to public attention as an example of resistance to intolerance and aggression, particularly now, when it is not uncommon to hear about vandalized cemeteries.

Each cemetery is a special place due to its symbolic meaning. Tombs are often the only traces of people who are gone forever. We, the living, have an obligation to keep the memory of their culture and customs alive.

The Magurycz Association dedicates its efforts not only to cemetery renovation. Their mission extends also to saving, recording and documenting cemetery art, roadside crosses and shrines and Orthodox art objects that would otherwise fall into neglect (baptismal fonts, crosses, chapels, mortuaries, archive records). Care for the natural environment in the areas of activity of the Association has been a recent addition to its tasks.

Young people are involved in tomb renovation projects, more than 30 of which have taken place to date. This is one more reason to rejoice that this year's Sergio Vieira de Mello Award went to the Magurycz Association. The Award Committee appreciates those who work in the service of collective memory and remind us how rich life was in the past when Poland was a country of many nations, traditions and cultures.


#### **Grounds for the Award Committee's decision in the Person category** **Mirosław Kowalski, Regional Director, PKO BP:**

Maryna Hulcia, a Russian language teacher, is a promoter of the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian cultures. Employed with the Polish Association of Legal Education since 2005, she has dedicated herself to challenging stereotypes inherited from the political past and opening the minds and hearts of her students to diversity and cultural difference. In pursuing this goal, she organizes concerts and exhibitions to

promote the often-overlooked cultures of these three countries. She has also initiated and managed charity collections for the Beslan children and for Chechen refugees, as well as organizing Russian soirees and meetings with a journalist from the Belarusian section of Radio Free Europe.

She is committed to promoting peaceful co-existence between communities, religions and cultures, as well as to challenging stereotypes of refugees and prejudices against "strangers" – inmates, former inmates and their families. Her efforts have led to the activation of social groups, while helping immigrants to adapt more easily to Polish reality. Refugees call her "Sister" and invite her to Ramadan celebrations, weddings, birthdays; in short, they treat her as one of their own. Her success in overcoming the distrust of Chechen and Ingush refugees is all the more notable given her Russian origin.

Her actions go beyond her normal responsibilities: she helps refugees and inmates find their foothold in a strange reality. She is a concerned and dedicated advocate of social groups threatened by exclusion. Her kind heart shines through in all she does and her enthusiasm is contagious. She motivates people to do something for themselves and others.





**Szymon Modrzejewski (Magurycz Association), Maryna Hulcia**



**Marcelo Andrade de Moraes Jardim**



**Szymon Modrzejewski**



**Magurycz Association, Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka**



**Maryna Hulcia**

## **Captive Mind Revisited Bios**

Ambassador of Brazil to Poland. Previously Director General for European Affairs (1996-2003) and Director for South American Affairs (1992-1996) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil. Served in Beijing, Geneva and New York. From 1992 to 1996 he was the Chairman of the Paraguay-Parana Rivers Waterways Council, later (1996-2003) served as the Executive Secretary of the Brazilian-German Economic Co-operation Commission, and of the Brazilian-Russian Inter-Governmental Co-operation Committee (1998-2002). Awarded the Order of St George and St Michael (United Kingdom), Légion d'Honneur (France), and the Order of Merit (Poland).

Norwegian social anthropologist, author of several ethnographic books, professor in the Department of Anthropology at Boston University. Previously Professor at the University of Oslo, the University of Bergen (where he founded the Department of Social Anthropology), Emory University and Harvard University. He is well-known among anthropologists for his transactional analysis of politic processes in the Swat Valley of northern Pakistan and his study of microeconomic processes and entrepreneurship in the area of Darfur in Sudan. Editor of the ground-breaking and highly influential *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) in which he outlines an approach to the study of ethnicity which focuses on the on-going negotiations of boundaries between groups of people.

Director of Studies at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford and Fellow of Green College, Oxford. Previously worked as Director of the International Broadcasting Trust (IBT), a specialist independent television production company, producing programmes on global affairs for BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and leading broadcasters around the world. Currently a Senior Associate at Oxford University's international development centre, Queen Elizabeth House and an Associate Fellow of the University's Environmental Change Institute. He is also Chair of Broadcasting Support Services (BSS), Trustee of the Media Trust/Community Channel and Fahamu.

Lloyd Dakin is the Regional Representative of UNHCR based in Budapest. Since 2005, he has been responsible for UNHCR's operations in Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic

### **Marcelo Andrade de Moraes Jardim**

### **Fredrik Barth**

### **John (Paddy) Coulter**

### **Lloyd Dakin**

### **Michael Daxner**

### **Kathinka Dittrich van Weringh**

### **Paul Gillespie**

### **Danuta Glondys**

and Slovenia. In 2008, the region for which he is responsible will expand to include Bulgaria and Romania. Mr. Dakin joined UNHCR in 1980 in Thailand. He has previously served with UNHCR in Pakistan, Tanzania and twice at its Headquarters in Geneva. Prior to his current assignment, Mr. Dakin was as UNHCR's Representative in Armenia from 2001 to 2004. Mr. Dakin has an MA in International Administration.

Graduated in philosophy, pedagogy and English from the Universities of Vienna and Freiburg. Professor of Sociology and Jewish Studies, holds Honorary Doctorate of the State University of Novosibirsk. Advisor to the Afghani Minister of Education, works at the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research, advisor on Higher Education. Member of the UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo).

Worked with the Goethe-Institute in Barcelona, New York, Amsterdam, its central office in Munich and as founding director in Moscow. From 1994 to 1998 a cultural commissioner of the city of Cologne. Since 1998 she is a freelance consultant on cultural affairs and since 2003 the Chair of the European Cultural Foundation. Author of papers and books on culture, German foreign cultural policy, comparative cultural policy of various European countries and on EU cultural policy. Her most recent publications include *Does the European Union need a (complementary) foreign cultural policy?* (2004), and *A cultural component as an integral part of the EU's foreign policy?* (2006).

Foreign editor of *The Irish Times* and an associate editor of *openDemocracy* e-zine, scholarship holder of Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. He is the author, with John Palmer, of *'The Mission and Values of the Europe We Need'*, a document arguing the political case for closer European integration in an increasingly interdependent world. Author of Blair's *'Britain, England's Europe, A View from Ireland'*.

MA in English Philology (Jagiellonian University, Krakow) and in Political Sciences. Since February 2001 - Director of Villa Decius Association and independent consultant in the field of management of culture and development of civil society. Former Regional Director of USAID programme of development of local government in Poland and Head of Culture Department of the Municipality of Krakow in the period of 1993-1999. Author of new cultural policy for the municipality of Krakow City and of KRAKÓW 2000 programme.



MA in Spanish Philology, a PhD student at Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, laureate of the Spanish Government scholarship. As a member of a research group GEXEL, dealing with Spanish political migration during General Franco dictatorship, she works on Spanish section of The Congress of the Liberty of Culture. Translator into Spanish of Tomasz Kizneg's Gulag, contributor to numerous newspapers and magazines: Quimera (Barcelona), Laberintos (Barcelona), Zeszyty Literackie and Studia Iberystyczne. A member of 'Casa de l'Est' Association.

Secretary of State at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland with responsibility for social matters. Under-Secretary of State at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland from 2006. Development Director of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews from 2001 and Deputy Director from 2005 with responsibility for promotion in Poland and abroad. Received the Medal in Commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto from the Union of Jewish Second World War Veterans and Victims. Member of the Open Republic Association, the Jewish Historical Institute and the Association of Polish Journalists.

Essayist, publicist, translator and cultural activist. Researcher on Kiev University (economical cybernetics faculty) (1987-1990), since 1994 director of Cultural Policy Institute and deputy director of Ukrainian Center for Cultural Research (Kiev). since 1990 member of Ukrainian Writers Union, from 1993 to 1994 advisor to Ukrainian Minister of Culture. Former editor of Weswit, literary monthly. He is author of studies on cultural policy in independent Ukraine, and mass culture (editor of Essays on Ukrainian pop-culture, author of 'Własna mądrość'. Lives in Kiev.

Professor of Sociology and an expert on the social aspects of transformation in post-Communist societies. Former Director of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London from 2001-2006. Author of several monographs and numerous research articles focusing on Central Europe. Frequent exchange scholar including the British Academy exchange fellowship with the Polish Academy of Sciences as well as a Fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington DC. Member of the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) advisory committee on former Soviet Union and East European Studies (1995) and the HEFCE Advisory Group on Strategically Important and Vulnerable subjects (2005). Author and co-author many scientific and research publications.

#### **Olga Glondys**

#### **Oleksandr Hrycenko**

#### **Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka**

#### **George Kolankiewicz**

#### **Zdzisław Krasnodębski**

Sociologist and social philosopher. From 1976 to 1991 lecturer of theoretical sociology and social philosophy at the Warsaw University. Currently professor of the history of culture of Central and Eastern Europe at the University of Bremen (Germany) and contemporary sociology at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. Author of a number of books including 'Rozumienie ludzkiego zachowania' (Ways of Understanding Human Behavior), 'Upadek idei postępu' (The Fall of the Idea of Progress), 'Postmodernistyczne rozterki kultury' (Post-Modernistic Dilemmas of Culture), and 'Democracy of Peripheries'. He lives in Bremen.

#### **Joanna Krawczyk**

MA in English philology from the University of Warsaw and MA in Ethnic Relations and International Migration from Jagiellonian University. PhD student in Political and International Relations. Editor and translator of the portal LabforCulture.com. Contributor to Gazeta Wyborcza daily and the monthly cultural publication Lampa, member of the council of the arts foundation No Local. Associate of the Villa Decius Association since 2006.

#### **András Láncki**

Political scientist focusing upon political philosophy. He has been the Director for the Institute of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest since 2002. He is a lecturer in the history of 20th century political philosophy, political economy and democratic theory. He published five books, editing three encyclopaedias, and active in Hungarian public life. He was a Fulbright Professor at the Louisiana State University, was awarded the annual 'Bibó-prize' in 2003. A discussion leader of the Liberty Fund. He has been an advisor to the incumbent Hungarian President, László Sólyom.

#### **Les Levidow**

Senior Research Fellow at the Open University (UK), where he has been studying the safety regulation and innovation of agro-biotechnology. Co-organizer of Intercontinental Encuentro in Spain (1997) and three European Social Forums in 2002, 2003, 2004. Spokesperson for the Campaign Against Criminalising Communities (CAMPACC), active supporter of Jews Against Zionism (JAZ), both based in London. Contributor to leftist philosophical journal Radical Philosophy, co-editor of several books, including 'Science, Technology and the Labour Process' (1983); 'Anti-Racist Science Teaching' (1987); and 'Cyborg Worlds: The Military Information Society' (1989). Co-author of 'Governing the Transatlantic Conflict over Agricultural Biotechnology: Contending Coalitions, Trade Liberalisation and Standard Setting' (2006). Editor of the journal Science as Culture.

Professor of sociology and social anthropology. Head of the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University, Krakow. Former director of the Institute of Sociology of the Jagiellonian University (1991-1993) and former Dean of the Department of Philosophy (1993-1999). Author of numerous publications on social anthropology, sociology of culture, nation and ethnic relations. His publications include, inter alia: 'Kultura i osobowość w antropologii amerykańskiej' (1989), 'Symbols, Conflict and Identity' (1993) and 'Niechciane miasta: migracja i tożsamość społeczna' (1998).

Professor of Philosophy at Pedagogical University of Krakow, sociologist of culture, publicist. From 1993-1995 published in *Życie Warszawy* and *Rzeczpospolita* (since 1995 regular commentator in this title), since 1989 collaborates with *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Represents liberal economical views, and moderately conservative on social issues. In 1999 winner of the Grand Press Award, laureate of Kisiel Award in 2000.

Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva and New York specializing in issues of democratization, political economy, and labour relations in Eastern Europe. Author of two books on Polish politics (including 'The Defeat of Solidarity', recently translated into Polish), and is co-author of 'Workers After Workers' States' (2001) and the textbook 'European Politics in Transition'. Recently working on the transformation of European and American relations in both politics and culture and collaborating with quarterly magazine of Polish Academy of Sciences and Committee of Sociology Sociological Studies. Author of over 40 articles in scholarly and popular journals, including op-eds to the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune*.

Former Hungarian dissident, architect and designer. Holder of a Doctor of Liberal Arts degree of the Budapest University. In 1988 co-founder of the Network of Free Initiatives and the Liberal Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats. 1990-1996 Member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Culture and Member of Parliament. Since 1992 professor of film architecture at the Hungarian Film Academy. In 1995-1998 advisor to the Hungarian National UNESCO Committee. In 2003 Cultural Advisor to the European Union. Holder of numerous international awards, including Imre Nagy Prize, Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit and Solidarity Award (Poland).

**Zdzisław Mach**

**Janusz Majcherek**

**David Ost**

**László Rajk**

**John Ralston Saul**

Essayist and novelist, included in the prestigious *Utne Reader's* list of the world's 100 leading thinkers and visionaries. He has received many national and international awards for his writing, most recently the Pablo Neruda International Presidential Medal of Honour from the Chilean government. Saul is best known for his philosophical trilogy - 'Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West', 'The Doubter's Companion: A Dictionary of Aggressive Common Sense' and 'The Unconscious Civilization'. Author of five novels, including 'The Birds of Prey', an international best seller, as well as *The Field Trilogy*. General Editor of the Penguin 'Extraordinary Canadians' project. Co-Chair of the Institute for Canadian Citizenship, patron and former president of the Canadian Centre of International PEN. Companion in the Order of Canada (1999), Chevalier in the *Ordre des Arts et des Lettres* of France (1996). His 14 honorary degrees range from McGill and the *l'Université d'Ottawa* to Herzen State Pedagogical University in St. Petersburg, Russia.

**Jan Sowa**

Ph.D. degree in Sociology, studied Polish Studies, Psychology and Philosophy at Jagiellonian University and University Paris VIII in Saint Denis. Lecturer in The Institute of Public Affairs and Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the Jagiellonian University and Collegium Civitas in Warsaw. Published in scientific press, newspapers and cultural magazines, inter alia *Lampa*, *Krytyka Polityczna*, *Obywatel*. Editor in *Korporacja Ha!art* Publishing House. Author of a collection of essays 'Sezon w teatrze lalek'. Also worked as a journalist in Polish Public Radio, connected with Polish alterglobalist movement.

**Stanislav Shushkevich**

Head of the State of Belarus (1991-1994). Advocate of Belarus military neutrality, policy of dialogue and partnership with West. On 8th December 1991, together with the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed the Declaration dissolving the Soviet Union. Supported free market reforms and played a key role in the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Before his Presidency a prominent Belarusian scientist, a corresponding Member of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, Professor of Physics and Mathematics, author of award-winning textbooks (over 150 articles and 70 inventions), and recipient of numerous state awards. Chairman of the political party *Gramada*, running for the 2006 presidential elections. Chairman of Policy and Economics Research Center on Humanistic European University in Minsk. In June 2006 he received the Jan Nowak Jeziorański Award.

Ph.D. degree in sociology, assistant professor at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno and director of the Research Centre of Ethnicity and Culture in Bratislava. Previously researcher and executive director at the Documentation Center for the Research of Slovak Society (1991-1995), researcher at the InfoRoma Foundation and legal advisor for the UNHCR Bratislava (1995-1996), visiting fellow at the New School University in NYC and in 1999-2005 researcher at the think-tank Institute of Public Affairs (1999-2005) with expertise on the Slovak transformation process with a focus on national minorities and the state of civil society in Slovakia. Program Coordinator at Open Society Foundation (1997-1998). Since May 2000 World Bank consultant.

Graduated from the University of Vienna in Philosophy and German Literature. He has extensive experience in pan-European co-operation in the areas of education, culture, and management. Former Director of KulturKontakt Austria, a non-profit organization for educational and cultural co-operation with Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. A major multilateral program was the Task Force Education and Youth in Working Table I of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which was coordinated by KulturKontakt. He has also worked for the Austrian Ministry of Education and the Arts and was responsible for educational co-operation with central and eastern Europe. Director of the European Cultural Foundation (ECF).

Professor of social anthropology. She has done fieldwork in Egypt, Oman, Yemen, Bali, Bhutan and Scandinavia, and has published nine books, among others 'Life Among the Poor in Cairo', 'Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman', 'God Willing: Self-Made Destinies in Cairo', and 'Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe'. She has published extensively in international peer-reviewed journals. She has been a consultant to UNICEF and the World Food Programme, the Norwegian Development Organization and the UNDP. She has conducted research on poverty, gender, development, emotion, social justice, welfare, multiculturalism, and law. In 2004, she was awarded the Freedom of Expression Award.

Polish writer, playwright, film script writer and research professor at Oslo University and at Oxford University. Her short story collection 'Fables of the Irish Intelligentsia' was the winner of The Irish Times/Air Lingus Fiction Award. Her recent books include 'Culture and Crisis' and 'Diamonds' (New York). In 2005 awarded the prestigio-

**Michal Vašečka**

**Gottfried Wagner**


**Unni Wilkan**


**Nina Witoszek-Fitzpatrick**

**Jacek Żakowski**

us Freedom of Expression Prize for 'bringing novel, Eastern European perspectives into the Scandinavian public debate'. She devoted part of the award to establishing Solidarity Europe Association.

Journalist of Polityka weekly, and TOK FM radio, commentator for Gazeta Wyborcza. One of the founders of the newspaper in 1989. Chief of Journalism Faculty at Collegium Civitas. From 1989 to 1990, spokesman for Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny (the Citizens' Parliamentary Group, i.e. the parliamentary caucus of Solidarność deputies), first Chairman of Polish Information Agency. Honoured with numerous awards: SDP Award (1987), Adolf Bocheński Award (1986), Polish PEB Club Award (1988). Winner of the prestigious 'Grand Press' award as the Journalist of the Year (1997). Author of numerous books including 'The Lord of the Manor and the Vicar' with Adam Michnik and x. Józef Tischner, 'Poland for Beginners' with Jacek Kuroń, and 'Dark Interiors - the Imprisoned Primate'.

















© Copyright by the Villa Decius Association  
Kraków 2008

**Stowarzyszenie Willa Decjusza**  
ul. 28 Lipca 1943 roku 17 A, 30 233 Kraków  
tel. +48 12 425 36 38, fax: +48 12 425 36 63  
www.villa.org.pl

Edited by:

**Katarzyna Kopec**  
**Rafał Kopec**  
**Joanna Krawczyk**

Co-edited by:

**Danuta Glondys**

Proof-reading:

**Jonathan Stapleton**

Photographs:

**Patrycja Musiał**  
**Sylwia NIKKO Biernacka**

Cover photography:  
**Elżbieta Lempp**

Design and composition:  
**PIOTR Kaliński, [pio@pointblue.com.pl](mailto:pio@pointblue.com.pl)**

Printed by:

  
**vizualia**

ISBN: 978-83-88292-84-2



**PZU Życie SA**

The book has been  
financially supported by:

 **european cultural foundation**

